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Abstract
Broadly defined, this dissertation focused on the roles uncertainty, irreversibility, and
environmental regulation played in firm entry and exit decisions in energy markets. A
prominent innovation of this work was the integration of real options theory and applied
econometric techniques. Uncertain energy prices combined with irreversible sunk costs of
entry and exit create an economic benefit in delaying entry or exit, known as an option
value. An option value approach to understanding firm decisions presents a more robust
framework for capturing the impact of uncertainty and irreversibility on energy market
structure. Chapters 1 and 2 utilized this modeling approach, while Chapter 3 used applied
econometrics.
As a result, this dissertation can be split into two major themes. The first is the role
of uncertainty and irreversibility on market entry. Chapter 1 investigated whether a small
firm, drilling less than 8 natural gas wells, would have entered the natural gas market during
the hydraulic fracturing boom of the 2000s, given historic natural gas prices and reserves.
Chapter 1 also examined if technological advances in hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling,
and 3-D seismic imaging, land lease speculation, or a regime change in natural gas demand
drove small firm entry. Each hypothesis was tested using a real options model of market
entry and data on natural gas turnover.
The second theme involves the role of uncertainty, irreversibility, and environmental
regulation on energy market exit. Chapter 2 investigated this theme with both an optimal
stopping model and an empirical analysis of the drivers of coal-fired electricity generator
retirement.

Chapter 2 developed and implemented a real options model of coal-fired

generator retirement to back out the net retirement costs implied by the observed timing
of nearly 200 retirement decisions between 2009 and 2015. Propensity score matching was
vi

utilized to assign a retirement cost for the remaining active fleet of coal generators, and
the empirical analysis explored the impact of retirement costs on coal generator retirement
decisions. Chapter 3 continued work on the second theme by employing a difference-indifferences identification strategy to determine the impact of mercury regulation on coal-fired
electricity generator retirements.
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Chapter 1
Frack to the Future: What Enticed
Small Firm Entry During the
Hydraulic Fracturing Boom?
1.1

Introduction

U.S. natural gas gross withdrawals reached a new high in 2015 at 2.8 trillion cubic feet
for the month of March [119]. Production has been on a sharp upward trend since 2005
for two reasons. First, technological advances in horizontal drilling, 3-D seismic imaging,
and hydraulic fracturing (fracking) have made it highly profitable for firms to produce large
quantities of shale gas [131]. A second, and often, overlooked source of increased production
is an increase in the number of active firms in the market.1 [132] found that between 2000
and 2008 the number of firms actively drilling for natural gas in shale plays increased from
15 to 244. While the natural gas market has historically been dominated by large firms,
these new firms were small drilling between one and five wells. Similar changes in market
structure have been associated with decreased incumbent firm profits and value [58, 6],
overcapitalization [110], productivity growth [62, 42], and increased market responsiveness
1

A firm is considered active if it drills a well in a particular year; a firm becomes inactive by either exiting
the market or mothballing operations. A project is mothballed when it is put into a state of temporary
suspension, allowing it to be reactivated in the future at a sunk cost much less than the original upfront
sunk costs.

1

to exogenous shocks [2]. There are also questions about the persistence of these changes
in market structure due to the possibility that these small firms are engaging in hit-andrun entry [9]. Identifying the persistence and implications of the recent changes in market
structure requires an understanding of the incentives for firms to enter and exit the domestic
natural gas market. This study utilizes real options theory and data on natural gas firm
turnover to test explanations for the change in market structure that accompanied the recent
natural gas fracking boom.
There are three potential explanations for recent changes in the domestic natural gas
market. The first is that technological advances in natural gas extraction changed potential
entrants’ expectations of future resource availability and profits. High rates of entry have
been linked with innovation in many industries [44]. In the natural gas industry, two
technological innovations increased the expected value and lowered the variance of future
reserves. First, advances in horizontal drilling and fracking reduced the costs of production,
making previously unrecoverable reserves in shale plays recoverable. Small firms entering
the market in the 2000s would have expected recoverable reserves to be larger than had been
suggested by historic data. Second, the development of 3-D seismic imaging provided firms
with a more accurate estimation of reserves under a piece of land [131]. This made future
profits more predictable by reducing the variability in natural gas produced per well.
The second potential explanation concerns land lease speculation. For a firm to enter the
natural gas market, it must secure land leases, mineral rights, and drilling permits. A long
history of work published in the industrial organization literature illustrates the important
role sunk costs play as a barrier to market entry. Small firms that entered the natural gas
market in the 2000s were quite possibly engaged in lease speculating. Because land leases
can be resold, small firms that entered the natural gas market in the 2000s may have been
acquiring mineral rights with the expectation of reselling the lease at a higher price. [132]
noted that leases typically require the firm to drill at least one well within a specific time
frame and postulated that speculation could be the reason they observed a large number of
firms drilling only a single well in their data. Lease appreciation would erode barriers to
market entry, such as sunk costs [7, 88, 8, 100, 22], thus making market entry more appealing.

2

The third potential explanation is regime change in natural gas demand. The 2000s were
marked by the highest and most volatile natural gas prices in history. There are numerous
reasons potential entrants may have viewed these higher and more volatile prices as a sign
of a regime change in natural gas demand. Large energy consumers began substituting coal
for natural gas partly in response to expected changes in environmental policy. For example,
a widely-adopted strategy for many electric utilities in response to the Clean Power Plan
was to retire coal-fired generation capacity and invest in natural gas generation [89]. This
increase in natural gas generation market share may have been viewed by potential entrants
as a permanent shift to a new regime characterized by higher but more volatile natural gas
prices.
Static two-stage oligopoly models are typically used to study market entry in the
industrial organization literature [14]. These models are ill-suited for our analysis for two
reasons. First, they typically assume incumbents and new entrants are described by a single
representative firm. This runs counter to empirical evidence suggesting that new entrants
in the natural gas market are much smaller than incumbent firms. Second, static models
struggle to capture the effect of firm expectations on market entry decisions [51]. Changes in
expected future profits are at the heart of all three of the potential explanations for natural
gas market structure changes.
An alternative framework for studying the effect of these explanations on market entry
that captures firm heterogeneity and expectations of future profits is real options theory
[33, 91, 35, 40]. Real options theory views market entry as an uncertain investment and treats
the decision to enter as an investment option. There is a real economic benefit (an option
value) for potential entrants in the natural gas market to delaying sunk entry costs in order to
observe the evolution of recoverable reserves and prices. A standard Marshallian investment
rule would ignore the option value and suggest entry as soon as expected discounted profits
marginally exceed the fixed costs required to enter the market. Market entry based on such
a strategy would occur too soon and would fail to maximize the value of the firm.
However, accounting for the effect of lease speculation on market entry requires that we
account for the incentives that influence market exit as well since the capital gains from lease
appreciation are only felt when the firm resells the lease upon market exit. To address the
3

lease speculation argument, we adopted a regime switching model [16] where firms chose the
timing of entry and exit given uncertainty in future reserves and prices. The method treats
entry and exit as a set of compound investment options [45], which allows us to account for
the option value associated with entering and exiting the natural gas market. These options
are linked since entry triggers the option to exit. This feature of the regime switching model
is particularly appealing for our investigation of land lease speculation. The cost of exiting
the market in this case would be a payment to the firm for selling the mineral rights at a
higher price than when purchased. Because the regime switching model accounts for exit
costs and the option to exit, we can investigate the possibility of land lease speculation as a
driver of small firm entry during the natural gas boom. Taking a regime switching approach
allows us to account for hysteresis in which entry and exit depends not only on current
reserves and prices, but also the history of reserves and prices [34].
Previous applications of real options theory to energy resources have focused on the
timing of production from a single well or mine [87, 26, 24, 66, 60, 82].2 [76] noted that the
mine operator’s decision to extract resources from the mine or shut down is analogous to a
firm’s decision to enter or exit an industry.
However, the timing of market entry differs from the timing of production for a single
resource asset in several ways. First, the reserves associated with a single well or mine are
finite and decrease with extraction, whereas the reserves held by a firm may increase due
to the acquisition of additional mineral rights as long as the firm remains in the market.
Treating market entry as the start of production for a single resource asset effectively
predetermines the length of time the firm remains in the market. Second, the size of
reserves held by the firm in the future is difficult to predict and evolves stochastically as
new mineral rights are obtained by the firm. The reserves associated with a single well or
mine are relatively well-known when production is initiated, and any uncertainty is more
appropriately modeled as a time-invariant random variable. This suggests firms considering
market entry face more sources of uncertainty than firms considering the timing of production
for a given resource asset. This distinction is even more pertinent for entry into the natural
2

Real options literature contains many applications in environmental and natural resource economics.
These papers cover a wide range, including real options applications to climate change policy [23, 92, 94, 95,
96], renewable resources [21, 99, 70, 59, 83, 107], and nonrenewable resources [17, 25, 108, 27, 28].
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gas market due to the relatively short lifetime of a fracked well.3 Third, the sunk costs of
market entry differ from the sunk costs associated with production.4 The sunk costs incurred
to extract from one well or mine typically derive from purchases of capital equipment for
drilling (either rented or purchased rigs) and general construction costs. However, the sunk
costs associated with entering the natural gas market include the cost of securing the mineral
rights and obtaining multiple drilling permits. These costs can constitute 28.8% of the total
drilling costs but are typically omitted from studies that focus on the optimal timing of
resource extraction [52].
The current investigation of natural gas market entry forces revealed three key findings.
First, the expectation of higher natural gas proved reserves per well and higher natural
gas wellhead prices are two likely reasons for the boom in small firms entering the natural
gas market. It takes less than a 25% increase in expected reserves per well to entice small
firms to enter. In contrast, the long-run mean reserve level increased 39% between 2000
and 2014 [115]. This suggests that technological advances such as horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing that increased economically viable natural gas reserves helped change
the domestic natural gas market structure. In addition, the average natural gas wellhead
price in the 2000s was double that of the previous 25 years. If small firms based their
expectation of future prices only on observed prices after the boom began (2000 to 2012),
our model suggests they would have entered between 2005 and 2008, which is precisely what
the data indicates. Second, land lease speculation could also explain small firm entry during
the boom. If these firms expected their land lease to appreciate by 30%, a firm drilling just
one well would enter at any wellhead price and reserve quantity. Last, implausibly large
reductions in reserve volatility would be needed to explain market entry by smaller firms.
This suggests that 3-D seismic imaging is an unlikely driver of the observed changes in the
domestic natural gas market structure.5
3

The lifetime of a fracked natural gas well is approximately two years, whereas the lifetime of a copper
or coal mine can routinely extend beyond twenty years [73, 111].
4
Following [10], we define sunk costs as costs that cannot be eliminated even by total cessation of
production. In contrast, fixed costs are costs that are not reduced by decreases in output so long as
production is not discontinued altogether. Thus, not all sunk costs are fixed and not all fixed costs are
sunk.
5
However, these factors may have driven the fracking boom through increases in average production per
well, which our model does not consider.
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The following section presents the model, and the data and parameter estimation are
described in in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results, and Section 5 offers conclusions.

1.2

Entry and Exit in the Natural Gas Market

A firm may be in one of two states: out of the market (S = 1) or inthe market (S = 2). Based



on its existing status, the firm receives a flow payoff π(P, R, S) =
P (t)−AC(R(t)) Q(S)
where Q represents the total natural gas produced by the firm. P (t) is the natural gas
wellhead price, and R(t) is the proved natural gas reserves per well held by the firm. AC(R)
is the firm’s average cost of extraction with

∂AC
∂R

< 0 [90]. The firm produces no natural gas

if it is out of the market: Q(1) = 0. When the firm is in the market, it produces natural gas
Q(2) > 0 that generates a flow of profits.
Market entry constitutes a move from S=1 to S=2 and instantaneously triggers the
flow payoff π(P, R, 2). However, entry requires a firm to pay two costs. The first is sunk
costs associated with leasing, acquisition, and permitting. Firms acquire mineral rights by
consulting geologists on land choice, hiring landmen to negotiate terms with landowners,
investigating the mineral interests, and researching the title to ensure the correct landowner
is associated with the lease. If the preliminary title check is completed and approved, the
lease is signed, taken to the county courthouse, and filed by paying a fee. A signing bonus
is typically paid up front and is an important factor for landowners when negotiating the
terms of their mineral rights [52]. Following initial research on the mineral rights, the title
is further investigated by a title abstractor to check for errors, heirs, rights-of-way, wills,
and unrelated mineral interest conveyances. This is done before any construction can be
initiated on the land and adds another cost to the firm. One last inspection of the title
is completed, which is known as curative title and development. Any missed research is
overseen by legal entities before drilling can commence. The curative team may find, for
example, an additional family member who must sign the lease. Work completed by the
curative team closes out the labor costs associated with leasing and acquisition. The firm
must also obtain various permits for drilling for natural gas before entering the market. Once
permitting is complete, the firm may begin construction of wellpads and rigs. These sunk
6

entry costs, K, are a function of the size of the firm proxied by the quantity of natural gas
produced, Q, with

∂K
∂Q

> 0 and

∂2K
∂Q2

< 0. The second entry cost is the price paid for the lease

L. The firm can enter
at sunk cost K(Q) + L and receive a flow of
the natural gas market
 
profits π(P, R, 2) =
P (t) − AC(R(t)) Q .
If prices or reserves fall, a firm may choose to exit the market. Market exit constitutes a
move from S = 2 to S = 1 and terminates the flow of profits: π(P, R, 1) = 0. Market exit
requires a fee, F , that represents remediation and cleanup costs but also allows the firm to
sell the mineral rights it holds at price sL. The lease depreciates in value while the firm is in
the market when s < 1 and appreciates in value when s > 1. If prices or reserves rise in the
future, the firm may choose to re-enter the market, which requires the firm to pay K + L but
restarts the flow of profits. Because market exit is not permanent, our model accommodates
both decommissioning (F > 0) and temporarily mothballing drilling operations (F = 0) to
avoid environmental cleanup [82].
While current prices and reserves are known, future prices and reserves are unknown.
For example, proved natural gas reserves per well R(t) for a firm’s current lease holdings are
known, but future levels of reserves held by that firm are unknown. The volume of natural
gas that ultimately will be produced cannot be known ahead of time, and the estimates
change as extraction technologies improve, markets evolve, and natural gas is produced.
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) has been used to model stochastically evolving reserves
for a single resource asset [90]. For the purposes of this study, the stochastic reserve process
must reflect the evolution of a firm’s reserve holdings. Firms are continuously acquiring new
leases, which allows them to replenish what they extract. Reserves per well are assumed to
evolve according to geometric mean reversion (GMR), dR = rR (R̄ − R)Rdt + σR RdzR . Here,
rR is the rate of reversion to the mean reserve level, R̄ is the long-run mean reserve level, and
√
σR is the standard deviation rate. dzR = (t) dt is the increment of the standard Weiner
process, where (t) is a standard normal variate. Allowing the stock of reserves held by the
firm to revert to a long-run mean assumes that exploration, research and development, and
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technology advances permit discovery and recoverability of natural gas that matches the
amount of reserve withdrawals over time.6
Future wellhead prices are also unknown; wellhead prices evolve randomly around a
long-run mean following a similar geometric mean-reverting process dP = rP (P̄ − P )P dt +
σP P dzP . The uncertainty encompassing future wellhead prices is due to fluctuations in the
market. Shifts in supply and demand influence market prices, and the price elasticity of
both demand and supply determine the degree of the price response. For example, there is
a significant lead time required for firms to bring additional natural gas to the market since
pipeline capacity expansions are necessary to eliminate transmission issues. The uncertainty
is not idiosyncratic to a firm. [93] determines that energy prices, including natural gas, are
mean-reverting by testing a century’s worth of data. Modeling natural gas wellhead prices
as GMR prevents any negative prices. Real options results depend on choosing the correct
stochastic process; therefore, a unit root test is used to check the GMR assumptions for
natural gas wellhead prices. We reject the null hypothesis that the price process follows
geometric Brownian motion (Appendix 1). A lack of data prevents the completion of a unit
root test on proved reserves per well. However, visual inspection of the data suggests they
do not follow geometric Brownian motion (Appendix 1, Figure A.1).
The decision problem is presented in terms of a risk-neutral firm whose objective is to
determine if and at what time to enter tE and exit tX the natural gas market to maximize
the firm’s expected discounted profits. The decisions to enter and exit the market in this
discontinuous or threshold control setting are made with the knowledge that all future
adjustments will be optimal. Using traditional cost-benefit analysis, the firm would enter the
market when the expected net present value of profits equals or exceeds the costs associated
with entry. However, since many of the costs of entry are sunk, there is an incentive (an
option value) to delay entry longer than suggested by cost-benefit analysis to further observe
how profitable it will be to drill a natural gas well.
6

As a robustness check, we model natural gas proved reserves per well as a declining GBM. Switching
from geometric MR to declining GBM does not significantly change the results.
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At each instant in time, the firm must determine whether to enter the market or stay out
given that all future exit and entry decisions are made optimally. Given the discount rate δ,
the optimal entry and exit time satisfies the following:
"
V (P0 , R0 , 1) = max E0
tE

"Z

tX

V (P0 , R0 , 2) = max E0
tX

#


V P (tE ), R(tE ), 2 − L − K(Q) e−δtE


(1.1)




−δt
π P (t), R(t), 2 e dt + V (P (tX ), R(tX ), 1) − F + sL e−δtX


#

0

(1.2)
subject to dP , dR, P (0) = P0 , and R(0) = R0 .
[35] showed that the decision to enter the market is made based on a comparison of
the optimal value function that arises when continuing with the status quo, S = 1, and
the present value of profits when the firm enters the market, S = 2, minus the sunk costs
associated with entry K(Q). V (P0 , R0 , 1) is simply the option value since there is no flow of
profits when the firm is not in the market. This option value represents the value of delaying
entry into the market to gain more information about the profitability of drilling for natural
gas.7 V (P0 , R0 , 2) is the expected net present value of profits plus the option value associated
with exiting the market (net the cost of exit).
[16] established that the optimal switching problem can be rewritten as a set of variational
inequalities. Before entering the market, the optimal value function satisfies

∂V (P, R, 1)
∂V (P, R, 1)
+ rR (R̄ − R)R
+
∂P
∂R
1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (P, R, 1) 1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (P, R, 1)
∂ 2 V (P, R, 1)
σP P
+
σ
R
+
σ
σ
ρP
R
(1.3)
P R
2
∂P 2
2 R
∂R2
∂P ∂R

δV (P, R, 1) ≥ rP (P̄ − P )P

V (P, R, 1) ≥ V (P, R, 2) − L − K(Q)
7

(1.4)

When the firm enters the market, this option value is terminated, making it an additional opportunity
cost of entering. It is this opportunity cost that prompts a more cautious response by the firm in the face of
uncertainty.
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ρ is the correlation coefficient between the two stochastic processes P (t) and R(t): ρ =
corr(dzP , dzR ). In financial terms, the firm holds an asset whose value V (P, R, 1) must be
optimally managed (i.e. maximized). The left-hand side of (1.3) is the return the firm would
require to delay entering the market over the time interval dt. The right-hand side of (1.3)
is the expected return from delaying market entry over the interval dt. This equation acts
as an equilibrium condition ensuring a willingness to delay prior to market entry. Equation
(1.4) compares the total payoff when the firm is in the market and out of the market and
acts as a boundary condition for the entry regime. One of the conditions (1.3) or (1.4) is
satisfied at each point in the state space of P (t) and R(t). If (1.3) holds as an equality, it
is optimal to delay entering the market (remain in regime 1). However, if (1.4) holds as an
equality, it is optimal to enter the market immediately (switch from regime 1 to 2).
When the firm is currently in the market, the optimal value function satisfies

∂V (P, R, 2)
∂V (P, R, 2)
+ rR (R̄ − R)R
+
∂P
∂R
1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (P, R, 2) 1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (P, R, 2)
∂ 2 V (P, R, 2)
σ P
+ σR R
+ σP σR ρP R
(1.5)
2 P
∂P 2
2
∂R2
∂P ∂R

δV (P, R, 2) ≥ π(P, R, 2) + rP (P̄ − P )P

V (P, R, 2) ≥ V (P, R, 1) − F + sL

(1.6)

Equation (1.5) compares the expected and required return from delaying market exit. If
equation (1.6) holds as an equality, it is optimal to remain in the market (remain in regime
2). Much like equation (1.4), equation (1.6) acts as a boundary condition for regime 2. If
equation (1.6) holds as an equality, it is optimal to exit the market (switch from regime 2 to
1).
V (P, R, 1) includes an option value that delays firm entry.

V (P, R, 2) includes an

additional option value that delays firm exit. From (1.6), this additional exit option value
encourages more immediate market entry compared to the case in which entry is irreversible.
This highlights the linked nature of the market entry and exit options. The ability to exit
the market makes the firm less cautious about entering the market, but the possibility of
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exiting the market also increases the option associated with entering the market. Intuitively,
the option to enter a market is more valuable if it is only partially irreversible. The impact
of exit on the timing of market entry depends on which of these two effects dominate.
The solution to the variational inequalities in (1.3)-(1.6) can be characterized by an entry
curve PE (R) that separates the state space where market entry should occur conditional on
the firm being out of the market at the time. Specifically, the entry curve is the set of points
where conditions (1.3) and (1.4) are met. An exit curve PX (R) divides the state space into
regimes where the firm should and should not exit given where the firm is positioned in the
market. Based on expectations of future profits, the firm optimally enters the market when
an increase in prices or reserves crosses the threshold curve PE (R). The firm optimally exits
the market if a drop in prices or reserves cross the threshold curve PX (R).
Numerical methods are used to determine PE (R) and PX (R) for all levels of Q. One goal
of this study was to find the minimum total production level of a firm (Q) that entered the
natural gas market during the boom and determine if that production size is consistent with
a small firm. Numerical methods are required to approximate the unknown value function
due to the multi-dimensional nature of the state space [81]. Using piecewise linear basis
functions, we approximated V (P, R, 1) and V (P, R, 2) over a subset of the state space [75].
The approximation procedure solves for the 2 x n x m basis function coefficients, which
satisfy (1.3) - (1.6) and relevant boundary conditions at a set of n = 50 and m = 100
nodal points spread evenly over the two-dimensional state space.8 The following necessary
boundary conditions are true whether S = 1 or S = 2: V (0, R, 1) = 0 and V (P, 0, 1) = 0.
These ensure that there is no value of entering the market when natural gas wellhead prices
are 0 or when proved reserves per well are 0.
8

Upwind finite difference approximations are used to construct a linear spline, which approximates the
unknown value function. We used Matlab, along with the CompEcon Toolbox and the smoothing-Newton
root finding method, to solve the resulting complementarity problem. The approximated state space ranges
from 0 to 30 in the P dimension with m = 50 nodal points and from 0 to 1, 270, 000 in the R dimension
with n = 100 nodal points. Extending the state space in either the P (t) or R(t) dimension or increasing the
number of nodal points beyond 50 and 100 does not alter general results.
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1.3

Data and Parameter Estimation

Estimates of the parameters included in (1.3)-(1.6) are required to approximate V (P, R, 1)
and V (P, R, 2) over a subset of the state space. To investigate the three possible explanations
behind the structural change of the natural gas market, we parameterized a pre-boom model
where firms form expectations over future prices and reserves based on the natural gas
market in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s - where prices were less volatile and reserves were
less plentiful. Following [55], we also assumed natural gas firms use a 9% discount rate
δ = 0.09.9 All parameter values are for the baseline, pre-boom model (Table 1.1). Key
model parameters were adjusted to reflect changing firm expectations and lease speculation
behavior.

1.3.1

Wellhead Prices & Proved Reserves

A critical step in solving the regime switching model is defining firm expectations over
wellhead prices (P ) and reserves per well held by the firm (R). The dynamics of wellhead
prices and reserves changed drastically around 2000 (Figure 1.1). U.S. natural gas monthly
wellhead price data (in dollars per thousand cubic feet: $/Mcf) are drawn from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) from January 1976 to December 2012.

We

completed a Zivot-Andrews unit root test that allows for a single break in the intercept of
wellhead price data to determine whether there was a structural break in the time series due
to the boom [135]. In January 2000, there was a structural break in the intercept of wellhead
prices with a 1% significance level. This result is consistent with [131] and [132]. Therefore,
we used price data from January 1976 to December 1999 to characterize price expectations
before the fracking boom. We followed Pachamanova and Fabozzi [86] to estimate rP , P̄ ,
and σP (Appendix 1). The rate of reversion for wellhead prices is 2.35%, and the long-run
mean is $2.12 per Mcf. Wellhead price volatility is 6.92%.
Firm expectations of reserves per well (in thousand cubic feet per well: Mcf/well)
are calculated using EIA data on annual U.S. natural gas (wet after lease separation)
9

We account for discount rates above and below the baseline model value of 9% in our sensitivity analysis.
Our results do not change significantly.
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proved reserves and the number of gas and gas condensate wells from 1989 through 1999.10
Reserves and well count data are specific to Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia to match [132]. These eight states have the largest
shale gas plays - Barnett, Marcellus, Haynesville, Eagle Ford, Woodford, Fayetteville, and
Devonian shales in the Appalachian basin - and are responsible for over 73% of total U.S.
shale gas production in October 2016 [118]. Again, these parameters are estimated using
[86] (Appendix 1). The rate of reversion to the long-run mean for proved reserves per well
rR is 0.00013%. The long-run mean R̄ is 343,235 Mcf, and the volatility σR is 3.00%.
Prices and reserves may be positively or negatively correlated. Negative correlation could
reflect increasing prices due to scarcity. However, positive correlation could also reflect
increased exploration as prices rise. To capture the correlation between these two stochastic
processes, we used the cross-correlation function of the two time series discussed above
to calculate the correlation between wellhead prices and proved reserves per well. The
correlation coefficient is −0.55 between changes in their levels.

1.3.2

Sunk Costs

[52] contains detailed information on all sunk costs required to drill a natural gas well.
There are no publicly available data on sunk costs associated with leasing, acquisition, and
permitting for different sized firms that could be used to specify a relationship between K
and Q. However, economies of scale are likely. A firm typically negotiates with the landowner
for at least one square mile of land, or 640 acres. A well with a depth of 1,000 feet requires
one acre of land [85]. That leaves room for far more than one well to be drilled on the leased
land. As the number of wells increases, the sunk costs increase but not at a one for one
basis. A concave sunk cost function captures these economies of scale and ensures there is a
minimum number of wells drilled to trigger entry.11 For exposition, we assumed the following
functional form: K = b(Q)0.75 . We used the average production per firm for 2000 provided
by [132], with the sunk costs of obtaining the mineral rights and permits for drilling one
10

A Zivot-Andrews unit root test cannot be completed for natural gas proved reserves per well due to a
lack of data.
11
A convex sunk cost curve leads to a firm entering the market up until a maximum firm size based on
wells drilled, which is inconsistent with the current natural gas market.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Prices and Wet After Lease Separation Proved
Reserves per number of gas and gas condensate wells for AR, KY, LA, OH, OK, PA, TX,
and WV: 1989-2012.
well from [52], to estimate b. The value for b equals 180.71 and completes the functional
relationship between sunk costs and firm production.12
The decision to enter the natural gas market requires accounting not only for sunk entry
costs, but also the sunk costs associated with exit. Entering a market is inherently tied to the
option to subsequently exit that same market. For firms in the natural gas market, the costs
of exit are related to site remediation. Included in [52] are estimates for land reclamation
costs. Re-contouring portions of the cleared well site and reclamation of temporary roads are
part of the remediation costs as well as those associated with restoring topsoil, re-vegetation,
and landscaping. Total reclamation fees, F , are on average $650,000 for one well. Firms that
entered the market hold mineral rights and land leases whose value changes over time. Data
on how land leases appreciate or depreciate are not publicly available. For the benchmark
model, we assumed the lease value just offsets reclamation costs, sL = F , so that market
exit is costless. For this to be the case, s = 0.30, indicating that the lease depreciates by
70% in the benchmark case. We explored alternative values for s in our hypothesis tests.
12

We varied the exponent between 0 and 1 to account for different degrees of concavity. The results are
robust in these changes.
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1.3.3

Average Production Costs

To get a measure of average production costs per well in terms of dollars per thousand
cubic feet, we collected the annual U.S. nominal cost per natural gas well drilled from the
EIA between 1989 and 1999 ($/well). We also collected the annual U.S. natural gas gross
withdrawals in thousand cubic feet over the same time frame from the EIA and used the
annual number of producing wells for the eight states mentioned above. By dividing gross
withdrawals by the number of wells, we obtained a measure of the average production per
well (Mcf/well). Taking a ratio of cost per well ($/well) and average production per well
(Mcf/well) provides the measure of average production costs per well in terms of dollars per
Mcf needed to estimate the AC(R(t)) relationship. However, the average cost per well data
from EIA includes all costs for drilling and equipping wells for surface-producing facilities both production and sunk costs.
We removed the portion of average costs not used in the production of the natural gas
well by applying criteria explained in [46]. Capital is more sunk when there is a low ability
to lease capital, no or limited second-hand markets exist, and if capital depreciates slowly.
Using these criteria, we determined which costs included in [52] are sunk. By splitting these
costs into production versus sunk costs, we determined the percentage of the costs that are
not sunk (57.41%) and multiplied that by the EIA data on nominal costs per natural gas
well drilled. This leaves the cost per well in terms of production costs only. Utilizing the
apportioned average production cost per well and proved reserves per well data, we found
AC(R) is best represented by a power function: AC = (600, 000/R)2.634 (Figure 1.2).

1.4

Results

According to [132], the natural gas boom was marked by a high volume of small firms entering
the market, most intensely from 2005-2008. We focused our attention on the catalysts for
small firm entry during the boom. To answer this question, we determined the minimum
quantity of natural gas a firm had to produce to enter the market between 1989 and 2012
using pre-boom (prior to 2000) expectations defined by parameters rP , P̄ , σP , rR , R̄, and σR
(Table 1.1). These results serve as a pre-boom benchmark; each hypothesis for the increase
15

Figure 1.2: U.S. Natural Gas Wet After Lease Separation Proved Reserves per number of
gas and gas condensate wells for AR, KY, LA, OH, OK, PA, TX, and WV and Nominal
Cost per Natural Gas Well Drilled: 1989-1999.
in small firm entry is tested by altering key model parameters. Significant changes in the
minimum natural gas produced signify a driver of small firm entry during the natural gas
boom.

1.4.1

The Benchmark: Market Entry with Pre-boom Expectations

Entry thresholds for two total production levels that are the solution to the variational
inequalities in (1.3)-(1.6) represent market entry rules for a potential entrant whose
expectations of recoverable reserves and wellhead prices are based on historic data (Figure
1.3). The dotted line reflects the entry threshold for a firm producing over 300,000 Mcf per
year. To put that into context, we calculated the average rate of production per well from
1989 to 2012 using EIA data on U.S. natural gas gross withdrawals in thousand cubic feet
and the number of producing wells for the eight states identified in section 3.13 A simple
ratio of total production over calculations of average production rates provides the minimum
number of wells necessary for a firm to enter the market in any given year. The reserves per
13

Constant average production rates by year are used in the spirit of [5]. They determine that production
or flow from wells is constrained due to pressure in underground reservoirs. Thus, the rate of extraction does
not play a significant role in determining the output of a drilled well.
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Figure 1.3: Results with baseline expectations: 2007 - The solid line is the entry threshold
of a firm drilling 29 wells. The dotted line is the entry threshold of a small firm drilling 8
wells.
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Table 1.1: Natural Gas Entry Parameter Values: Pre-Boom Model, Up to 2000
Description
Wellhead Price Rate of Reversion
Wellhead Price Long-Run Mean
Wellhead Price Volatility
Proved Reserves Rate of Reversion
Proved Reserves Long-Run Mean
Correlation Coefficient
Discount Rate
Fixed Exit Cost
Variable Exit Cost
Sunk Entry Cost
Average Production Costs

Parameter
rP
P̄
σP
rR
R̄
ρ
δ
F = 0.30 ∗ 180.71(Q)0.75
sK = 0.30 ∗ 180.71(Q)0.75
K = 180.71(Q)0.75
AC(R) = 2x1015 R−2.634

Value
2.35%
$2.12/Mcf
6.92%
0.000129%
343, 235 Mcf/well
−54.82%
9.00%
Varies by Q
Varies by Q
Varies by Q
Varies by R

well and wellhead prices in 2007 are shown by *. Using 2007 as an example, production at
the level of the dotted line would require 8 wells given that the average well produced 37,964
Mcf in 2007. [132] demonstrated that new entrants were limited to drilling between one to
eight wells. A small firm (with less than 8 wells drilled) would not have found it optimal to
enter the natural gas market in 2007 according to our baseline model. A new entrant in 2007
would have needed to produce nearly 1.1 million Mcf in 2007 (29 wells) to justify entering
the natural gas market.
We used this same methodology to solve for the number of wells a firm would require to
enter the natural gas market in each year from 1989 to 2012 (Table 1.2). Results indicated
that firm entry was not likely until 2005 for any size firm. From 2005 to 2008, the minimum
number of wells necessary to enter the market trended downward, indicating a potential
shift in market structure during this period. The benchmark (pre-boom) model shows that
a small firm would have found it optimal to enter the natural gas market in 2008 without any
changes to firm expectations or lease appreciation required for entry. Both wellhead prices
and average reserves per well were high in 2008. After 2008, the minimum number of wells
needed to enter the market began to trend up, although with considerable variation. These
results are consistent with available data. While the fracking boom began as early as 2000,
few new firms were entering the market early in the shale gas boom. The top four firms in
the natural gas market drilled more than 80% of the wells drilled in major shale plays until
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Table 1.2: Pre-Boom Benchmark Model - Minimum Firm Size Entering the Natural Gas
Market, 2005-2012
Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Total Production, Q
2,273,180
8,092,382
1,100,956
235,452
41,684,720
1,426,029
3,129,836
85,207,512

Average Production per Well
34,972
35,807
37,964
39,242
38,885
43,213
46,027
53,288

Number of Wells
65
226
29
6
1072
33
68
1599

the early 2000s [132]. However, between 2005 and 2008, the number of active firms increased
by 50%. The number of active firms peaked in 2008 at nearly 250 but dropped by almost
38% by 2012.
While this benchmark model captures general trends in the data, it cannot explain the
multiple years of small firm entry observed in the data. We investigated three possible
hypotheses that may explain the more pronounced entrance of small firms during the boom.

1.4.2

Hypothesis 1: Technological Advances

Technological advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling increased R̄ in the
model by making previously unrecoverable reserves economically viable. Such increases
in the long-run mean a reserve level reduces the average cost of production. If small firms
believed that the long-run mean level of reserves was 25% higher than historic data indicated
due to increased penetration of these technologies, they would begin entering the market.
The baseline model is calibrated with the long-run mean at just over 343,000 Mcf per well,
which makes the average cost of production, AC(R), $5.26 per Mcf. A 25% increase in the
long-run mean reserve level (429,000 Mcf per well) drives average production costs down to
$2.92 per Mcf. A firm drilling just seven wells would have entered the market between 2005

and 2008 if R̄ was about 429,000 Mcf per well (Table 1.3). To compare, average reserves
per well were 790,000 Mcf in 2014, meaning that 2014 saw average reserves per well almost
double the long-run mean level before the boom. The benchmark model is calibrated with
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average production costs 56.6% lower than the average reserves per well in 2014. It is not
illogical to conclude that those firms in the 2000s, regardless of size, anticipated long-run
average reserve levels would increase.
Another technological advance may have changed firm expectations. During this period,
firms began using 3-D seismic imaging to provide a better picture of the structure and
properties of rocks below the surface of the ground. This technology served to reduce the
variability in well production. To test whether 3-D seismic imaging is a possible explanation
for small firm entry, we decreased the value of σR , proved reserves per well uncertainty, and
solved for the minimum size of firm entrants for 2005-2008, when the largest number of
active firms joined the market. The baseline model was calibrated with reserve uncertainty
at 3%. The minimum number of wells drilled for a firm that found it optimal to enter in
each year as reserve uncertainty is thus reduced by 5, 25, 50, and 75% (Table 1.3). Lowering
reserve uncertainty allows smaller firms to enter; however, even when reserve uncertainty
was less than one percent, a small firm would not have entered the market during 2005-2008.
Reserve uncertainty was low to begin with, so lowering further would not have resulted in a
significant change in a firm’s incentives to enter the market.

1.4.3

Hypothesis 2: Land Leases

If new entrants in the 2000s were lease speculating, they had to enter the market expecting
the value of their land lease would appreciate. This would have allowed them to exit the
market with a profit. At the onset of the fracking boom, shale gas plays that were previously
not explored for natural gas drilling became the primary focus for firms. The land comprising
these plays was wide open for natural gas firms to tap into as long as they acquired the
mineral rights from private landowners. Over the course of the boom, the land available for
lease from landowners declined. Firms were left to negotiate with other firms, instead of
landowners, for land leases. Firms were more able to assert market power to acquire natural
gas leases, allowing initial land leases to appreciate in value [129].
The benchmark model assumes costless market exit. A potential entrant expects to
recoup 30% (s = 0.30) of the lease value, which is just offset by the cost of site remediation
F . To test whether lease speculation was responsible for small firm entry, we specified that
20

Table 1.3: Hypotheses Results, 2005-2008

2005
5%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
169%
2006
5%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
169%
2007
5%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
169%
2008
5%
25%
50%
75%
100%
125%
169%

Hypothesis 1
R̄

Hypothesis 1
σR

28
6
4
3

63
59
55
53

Hypothesis 2
s

Hypothesis 3
P̄ = $5.71

30
16
7
87
7
4
3

220
201
185
174
104
51
8

15
5
3
3

29
28
27
26
14
8
6

6
4
3
2

6
6
6
6
4
2
4
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leases hold their value without any depreciation (or appreciation), taking s = 0.30 to s = 1.
If a firm expected the value of their lease to remain constant, exiting the market provided
a positive payment to the firm. This significantly decreases the minimum firm size required
for market entry. The benchmark model indicates that the smallest firm that would have
entered in 2007 was drilling 29 wells. The lease price associated with an operation that size
is $6.1 million. In the benchmark model, over $1.8 million was recouped upon sale of that
lease, but site remediation costs F are artificially set to cancel out that payment. However,
a lease speculating firm expecting to recoup the full value of the lease s = 1 would receive a
payment of $4.3 million for exiting the market.14 This makes the minimum number of wells
for a firm entering the natural gas market in 2007 drop to just 14 wells; there was a similar
trend in minimum firm size reduction for 2005-2008 (Table 1.3).
If the lease appreciates in value, the minimum firm size required for entry drops further.
An expected 25% appreciation in the lease value at the time of entry would have allowed
small firms to enter not only in 2008, but also in 2005 and 2007. Interestingly, we found that
once a firm expects to receive a payment just equal to what they paid to enter the market, a
firm of any size would find it optimal to enter at any positive wellhead price and reserve per
well level. Compared to the benchmark model, a firm would only have to expect the lease
value to appreciate by 30% at the time of entry for a small firm to enter in any year.

1.4.4

Hypothesis 3: Prices

Natural gas wellhead prices were relatively stable and hovered between $1 and $2 prior to
2000. The results of our pre-boom model are based on a long-run mean wellhead price
of $2.12 per Mcf. When applying wellhead prices from 2000 to 2012, the long-run mean
price level increases to $5.71. New entrants may have viewed the drastic increase in prices
after 2000 as a permanent demand shift. These firms would have weighed price data after
2000 relatively more heavily than pre-2000 prices when forming expectations about future
wellhead prices (Figure 1.4). Comparing the shift in wellhead price expectations for a firm
using historic pre-boom data (1976-1999) and a firm using only price data after 2000, a
The firm would not recoup the entire $6.1 million because there is still a fixed exit fee F . The benchmark
model assumes sK = 0.30K = F = $1.8 million for 2007.
14
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Figure 1.4: Natural Gas Wellhead Price Densities: The pre-boom density and during-theboom density have different means and standard deviations. The pre-boom density uses EIA
data on monthly wellhead prices from 1976-1999, while the during-the-boom density uses
data from 2000-2012.
wellhead price of $6/Mcf would have been viewed as highly unlikely prior to 2000. On the
other hand a potential entrant using only more recent price data would have viewed $6/Mcf
as a far more likely outcome.
If firms believed that the long-run mean was $5.71, small firms would have entered the
market from 2005-2008. A firm that formed expectations of future price based only on
observed prices after 2000 would have entered the market drilling 7 wells in 2005, 8 wells in
2006, 6 wells in 2007, and 4 wells in 2008 (Table 1.3). This suggests that the wellhead prices
observed after 2000 would have been sufficient to entice a small firm to enter the market.
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1.5

Conclusion

From the early 2000s, peaking in 2008, to present, the number of active firms in the natural
gas market has grown tenfold [132]. New entrants were small in size, which was a drastic
change compared to the prior 20 years. If these firms were utilizing historic data and
real options theory, our results indicate that they would have found it optimal to enter
only at the peak of the boom in 2008. Our results highlight three promising drivers that
explain the increased entry of small natural gas firms throughout the 2000s. First, small
firms expected an increase in the long-run mean level of natural gas proved reserves due
to technological advances. Small firms would find it optimal to enter between 2005 and
2007 if anticipating an increase of about 25% in the long-run mean reserve level from the
pre-boom price. In comparison, average reserves per well increased 37% after 2000. Another
promising explanation a change in expectations about natural gas wellhead prices. The longrun wellhead price level for years after 2000 was more than double that of historic prices.
Small firms that anticipated the regime change in natural gas demand would have found
it optimal to enter the market during the boom. Last, small firms could have entered the
natural gas market during the boom if they were lease speculating. If a firm believed it
could resell a land lease at a price 30% higher than the price paid to acquire the mineral
rights, it would have optimally entered drilling just one well for any year during the boom.
We found little evidence that the widespread adoption of 3-D seismic imaging could explain
the entry of small firms observed in the data between 2000 and 2008. We conclude that a
combination of shifts in natural gas proved reserves and prices as well as lease speculating
behavior induced small firm entry during the natural gas boom.
Changes in market structure affect not only market power, but a host of other important
factors such as firm profits, capitalization, productivity growth, and responses to shocks. If
wellhead prices for natural gas and lease speculation were the dominant forces for small firm
entry during the boom, the changes would be only transitory. Small firms will move out when
larger drilling firms buy out their mineral rights as prices stabilize. If the change in market
structure was mainly driven by the shift in natural gas reserves caused by technological
advances, then the make-up of the market would have been more permanent. Small firms
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will remain in the market. As new data becomes available, it will become more clear whether
the change in market structure is permanent or not.
[77] determined that the Henry Hub spot price in the U.S. has a high prevalence of jumps
in the data. Incorporating this into our model may lead to the conclusion that natural gas
prices have a larger role in the optimal entry decisions of a firm. It should also be noted
that the model presented in this paper has several other applications if a stochastic benefit
and cost process is involved in decision-making. These topics offer opportunities for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Drivers of Coal Generator
Retirements and their Impact on the
Shifting Electricity Generation
Portfolio in the U.S.
2.1

Introduction

Coal’s share of electricity generation in the United States was over 48% in 2008 and fell to
just over 33% in 2015 [121]. Because coal is typically used for baseload generation, this shift
in the generation portfolio has been due primarily to utilities choosing to retire coal-fired
generators rather than as a result of a decrease in dispatch at these units. These coalfired generator retirements have consequences for the economy [56, 15] and environment
[89, 74, 29, 63, 57, 67, 30]. Regions of the country that rely on coal production for jobs could
face increases in unemployment. However, a benefit to retiring coal generators is a reduction
in pollution emissions produced by the electricity sector. Formal analyses identifying the
forces that drive coal-fired generators into retirement are scarce [39]. Understanding the
relative importance of components included in the retirement decision can help isolate what
portion of these economic and environmental impacts are attributable to market forces as
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opposed to environmental regulation. This research utilizes real options theory and data
on coal generator turnover to identify the drivers of coal-fired generator retirement for all
coal-fired generators in the U.S.
Coal-fired generators are long-lived assets. Identifying drivers of coal-fired generator
retirements is akin to identifying whether the coal-fired generator will exit the market
and isolating the factors that shorten the generator’s time in the market. According to
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, engineering estimates of the
lifetime of a coal-fired generator account for the time it takes for the net present value of the
generator (inclusive of capital costs associated with initial construction) to fall to zero. Once
the net present value of operating the generator becomes negative, the generator is assumed
to have reached the end of its economic life. These engineering estimates of the lifetime of
a coal-fired generator can help identify a set of explanatory variables that could be used in
an empirical study of coal retirements.
However, relying solely on econometrics to identify potential drivers of coal-fired generator
retirements remains a significant challenge because many of the retirement costs are known
only to the utility. News articles and technical reports contain limited and wide-ranging
estimates of costs associated with decommissioning but do not account for the cost of
offsetting the generation lost to alternative technologies such as natural gas and renewables.
These costs may be somewhat offset by the scrap value of machines or the real estate value
of land and facilities, but these one-time benefits of retirement are also poorly understood.
Retirement cost becomes a key unobservable variable because it acts as a barrier to exit
[18, 106].1 Previous work on market exit attempts to proxy for the sunk costs associated
with market exit using a variety of methods. [101] accounted for sunk costs of exiting a
market using the ratio of rental payments to assets and primary product specialization ratio,
which measures the percentage output actually belonging to an industry. [105] used the
proportion of book value of assets that had not yet been depreciated to reflect sunk costs.
Unfortunately, these proxies are unable to account for the full range of costs that influence
coal-fired retirement decisions. For example, rental payments and firms’ assets will be unable
1

The literature also suggests lower rates of exit in capital intensive industries [37, 101, 105] and in
industries with larger average firm size [37].
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to account for decommissioning costs or the costs of offsetting the generation lost from
retirement. Previously used proxies will also be unable to account for the option value
associated with coal-fired generator retirements [33, 84]. Since many of these retirement
costs are sunk, there is an economic value (an option value) to delaying retirement in order to
observe the evolution of energy markets and regulation. The irreversibility of the retirement
decision and the unpredictability of energy markets can drastically increase the economic
lifetime of a coal-fired generator. For example, while the average engineering estimate of the
lifetime of a coal-fired generator is 40 years, over 89% of retired coal-fired generators that
retired as of 2015 were over 35 years old [117].
Instead of relying on proxies for the costs associated with coal-fired generation retirement,
we developed and implemented a real options model of coal-fired generator retirement to
back out the net retirement costs implied by the observed timing of 199 retirement decisions
between 2009 and 2015. Real options theory [35] treats retirement as an investment option.
Utilities and plant operators choose when to incur known retirements costs to permanently
shut down a coal-fired generator that is generating an unpredictable flow of profits and losses
due to uncertainty in energy markets and regulation. In addition to capturing the influence
of irreversibility and uncertainty, a real options approach also allows for heterogeneity
across coal-fired generators that can arise due to different electricity market structures. For
instance, in our model, coal-fired generator retirement in regulated electricity markets will
differ from retirements in deregulated markets due to differences in electricity and coal price
expectations [20].2 Previous applications of real options theory to the electric power sector
have focused on market entry decisions such as investments in renewable energy [68, 31],
investments in nuclear power plants [102], and electricity plant investments under undefined
climate policy [133].3 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time real options theory
has been used to calculate the costs associated with exiting a market across a large sample
of market participants.
2

Regulated electricity markets feature vertically-integrated utilities that own or control the entire flow of
electricity from generation to meter. Deregulated electricity markets divest all ownership in generation and
transmission and are only responsible for distribution, operations, and maintenance.
3
[19] provides a comprehensive review of real options theory applications to investments in electricity
generation projects.
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Since our real options valuation only estimates the retirement costs for generators that
have already retired, we employed propensity score matching on observable characteristics
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), U.S. Census Bureau, and PJM
Interconnection to associate sunk retirement costs with the remaining operational coal
generators in the U.S. We then estimated the impact of sunk costs on the probability of
retirement using a parametric approach. Our findings indicate the importance of sunk costs
in predicting the probability of coal generator retirements for the matched sub-sample. We
found that a one standard deviation increase ($45 million) in retirement cost from the mean
($71.6 million) is associated with an increase in retirement probability of 0.2%. Other factors,
like nameplate capacity, whether a plant has an ash impoundment, and competing natural
gas prices, significantly influence the retirement decision. As a test of our model’s predictive
power, we compared the predicted probability of retirement for the operating coal fleet to the
coal generators reported as retired in the EIA’s Form 860 preliminary data for 2016. Almost
half of the twenty operating generators with the highest predicted probability of retirement
in our sample retired in 2016. When we attempted the same prediction without accounting
for sunk costs of retirement, our success rate dropped considerably.
We present our model and describe the data and parameter estimation for the real options
model in the next section. Section 3 details the imputed retirement costs for retired coal
generators, while Section 4 describes and reports the results for our empirical analysis on
the impact of retirement costs on coal generator retirement. Section 5 offers conclusions.

2.2

Coal-Fired Generator Retirement Model

The following illustrates a case where an electricity generation firm (utility) generates
electricity with an existing coal-fired generator.4 The firm receives a flow payoff:
4

A generator contains all the equipment needed to produce electricity and typically operates
independently. Electric power plants can include multiple fuel generators which can use different fuels.
For that reason, we conducted our analysis at the generator level. We use the term generator and unit
interchangeably.
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π(PE , PC ) =


PE (t)qE (t) − PC (t)qC (t) − V C(qE (t)) − F C

(2.1)

where PE (t) is the wholesale electricity price, PC (t) is the price of coal, V C(qE ) is the variable
operating and maintenance costs, and F C is the fixed levelized capital cost of the generator.5
qE is the quantity of electricity supplied by the generator with
of coal used to generate qE with

∂qC
∂qE

∂qE
∂PE

> 0. qC is the quantity

> 0. This relationship between qC and qE captures the

generation technology of a specific generating unit with newer and more fuel efficient units
requiring less fuel to generate an additional unit of electricity.

2.2.1

Price Uncertainty

While current electricity prices and coal prices are known with certainty, future prices are
unknown. For example, prices paid for the firm’s on-site stock of coal are known, but future
prices of coal paid by the firm are unknown. Future coal price uncertainty can be somewhat
mitigated by purchasing coal on long-term contracts. Thus, firms that utilize long-term coal
contracts will be less exposed to coal price uncertainty than firms that purchase coal on
the spot market. [93] determined that energy (coal, crude oil, and natural gas) prices are
mean-reverting by testing a century’s worth of data. Following [93], future coal prices were
treated as random variables and assumed to evolve according to geometric mean reversion
(GMR), dPC = rPC (P¯C − PC )PC dt + σPC PC dzPC . Here, rPC is the rate of reversion to the
mean coal price level, P¯C is the long-run mean coal price level, and σPC is the standard
√
deviation rate. dzPC = (t) dt is the increment of the standard Weiner process, where (t)
is a standard normal variate. By not reaching 0 in any finite time [65], GMR prevents any
negative coal prices. The rate of reversion to the mean, the long-run mean coal price level,
and the standard deviation rate are all allowed to vary by generator to capture differences
in the types of coal used and the cost of transporting coal to different units. The Weiner
process does not vary across generators. This specification assumes coal market uncertainty
5

Following [10], we define sunk costs as costs that cannot be eliminated even by total cessation of
production. In contrast, fixed costs are costs that are not reduced by decreases in output so long as
production is not discontinued altogether. Thus, not all sunk costs are fixed and not all fixed costs are
sunk.
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is universal but responses to coal market shocks are idiosyncratic to the generator. In short,
the stochastic differential equation above describes the time-variant coal price distribution
facing a particular generator.
Unexpected shifts in supply and demand also influence the prices generators receive
for the electricity they produce. For example, electricity demand is sensitive to weather
conditions since weather variations lead to large variations in heating and cooling demand.
Electricity supply is subject to uncertainty surrounding entry of new and exit of old
generating capacities. Uncertainty in both the supply and demand side of electricity markets
introduces volatility into electricity prices [61]. To capture this uncertainty, electricity prices
evolve randomly around a long-run mean following a geometric mean-reverting process
dPE = rPE (P¯E − PE )PE dt + σPE PE dzPE . The mean reverting process captures the flat
load demand in many parts of the country in recent years. Similar to the coal price process,
the parameters that govern the stochastic electricity price process are allowed to vary by
generator to capture regional differences in regulated and deregulated electricity markets.

2.2.2

The Optimal Timing of Retirement

Based on the expectations of future coal and electricity prices, a coal-fired generator will
have a nonzero probability of operating at a loss (i.e. generating negative profits for the
firm). At some point in the future, a firm may choose to retire a coal-fired generator when
losses become too frequent. Retirement instantly eliminates the flow payoff π(PE , PC ) at
some sunk retirement cost, K. Retirement costs can vary widely depending on the level
of decommissioning. For instance, retirement costs may be minimal if the generator can be
retired while the site is maintained in its current condition with little cleanup needed to meet
environmental compliance and ensure safety.6 In contrast, full decommissioning requires
substantial sunk costs associated with dismantling all equipment, demolishing structures,
and site clean up including wet and dry disposal areas and coal yards. When a generator is
6

Environmental compliance includes adhering to the EPA’s Interstate Air Pollution Transport Rule,
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants regulations, the industrial waste rule for fossil fuel
combustion waste, the Cooling Water Intake Structures rules of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System, the Steam Electric Power Generating Effluent Guidelines and Standards, and the most recent
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards.
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retired, there is no legal requirement to demolish the infrastructure. As long as environmental
and safety regulations are followed, the site can remain intact and no decommissioning is
required. While the generator is operating, it produces electricity qE (t) > 0 using coal
qC (t) > 0 with costs V C(qE (t)) > 0 and F C > 0, which generates a flow of profits. If the
generator is retired, it produces no electricity and uses no fuel but incurs a sunk retirement
cost: qE (t) = 0, qC (t) = 0, V C(qE (t)) = 0, F C = 0, and K > 0.
The objective of a risk-neutral utility is to determine whether and when to retire an
electricity generator, tR , to maximize the generator’s expected discounted profits net of any
sunk retirement costs. Using traditional discounted cash-flow analysis, the firm would retire
the generator when the expected net present value of generation profits is less than the cost
to retire the generator. However, since the costs associated with retirement are sunk, there
is an incentive (an option value) to delay retirement longer than suggested by discounted
cash-flow analysis. This option value captures the economic value to a firm in being able
to respond to new information about coal and electricity markets. The size of this option
value is key to determining the timing of coal-plant retirements and will vary by generator
depending on coal and electricity market conditions, the efficiency of the coal-fired generation
technology currently being utilized, and the sunk costs required to retire.
At each instant in time, the firm must determine whether to continue operating the coal
generator or retire it given that all future retirement decisions are made optimally. Given
the discount rate δ, the optimal retirement time satisfies the following:

"Z

tR

V (PE0 , PC0 ) = max E0
tR





−δt

π PE (t), PC (t) e

#
 


−δtR
dt + V PE (tR ), PC (tR ) − K e

0

(2.2)
subject to dPE , dPC , PE (0) = PE0 , and PC (0) = PC0 . The evaluation at each instant in
time maximizes the expected profits from the coal-fired generator from that point forward
by making a choice to continue to generate electricity using coal (whose payoff is defined as
V ) or to retire and incur K.
Following [35], the retirement decision can be specified as an optimal stopping problem.
Treating retirement as an optimal stopping problem will ensure that the retirement decision
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maximizes the value of the coal-fired generation asset. While the generator is operating, it
not only provides a flow of profits π(PE , PC ), but it also means the firm holds an option
- the option to retire the generator when market conditions deteriorate V (PE , PC ). This
option value represents the value of delaying retirement to gain more information about the
profitability of coal-fired electricity generation. When the firm retires the generator, sunk
retirement costs K are incurred and the option value is terminated - making it an additional
opportunity cost of retirement. It is this opportunity cost that causes a more cautious
response by the firm in the face of uncertainty.
The generator’s unknown value function can be found by employing stochastic dynamic
programming with the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation

∂V (PE , PC )
∂V (PE , PC )
+ rPC (P¯C − PC )PC
+
∂PE
∂PC
∂ 2 V (PE , PC )
1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (PE , PC ) 1 2 2 ∂ 2 V (PE , PC )
σPE PE
+
σ
P
+
σ
σ
ρP
P
(2.3)
PE PC
E C
2
∂PE2
2 PC C
∂PC2
∂PE ∂PC

δV (PE , PC ) ≥ π(PE , PC ) + rPE (P¯E − PE )PE

ρ is the correlation coefficient between the two stochastic processes PE (t) and PC (t): ρ =
corr(dzPE , dzPC ). In financial terms, the firm faces an obligation to a flow of profits and
option value before retirement. The obligation is treated as an asset whose value V (PE , PC )
must be optimally managed (i.e. maximized). The left-hand side of (2.3) is the return the
manager would require to delay retiring the generator over the time interval dt. The righthand side of (2.3) is the expected return from delaying retirement over the interval dt based
on expectations of future coal and electricity prices. This equation acts as an equilibrium
condition ensuring a willingness to delay prior to retirement.
The HJB equation in (2.3) is a non-homogenous, second order partial differential equation
necessitating numeric methods to approximate the coal retirement value function [81]. Like
any differential equation, the HJB equation must be solved subject to a boundary condition.
We approximated the solution to the HJB equation by using the well-known value matching
condition [35]

V (PE , PC ) = K
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(2.4)

which acts as a boundary condition between the region of the state space where it is optimal
to continue operating the coal-fired generator and the region of the state space where it
is optimal to retire. We approximated V (PE , PC ) over a subset of the state space using
piecewise linear basis functions [75]. The approximation procedure solves for the 2 x n x
m basis function coefficients, which satisfy (2.3) and (2.4) at a set of n = 50 and m = 150
nodal points spread evenly over the two-dimensional state space.7
The combination of (2.3) and (2.4) ensures that the firm holds the option to retire the
generator until the value of the option to retire is equal to the cost of retirement. The
solution to the HJB equation (2.3) and value matching condition (2.4) can be characterized
by a retirement threshold PER (PC ) that separates the state space where retirement should
occur. Specifically, the retirement curve is the set of points where conditions (2.3) and (2.4)
are met. Based on expectations of future profits, the firm optimally retires a generator
when a decrease in electricity prices or an increase in fuel prices crosses the threshold curve
PER (PC ).
A closed-form solution for the retirement threshold only exists in the simplest models
where the HJB equation is an ordinary differential equation. With uncertainty in both the
coal and electricity prices, the HJB equation becomes a partial differential equation.

2.2.3

Data and Parameter Estimation

The optimal stopping problem described in (2.3) and (2.4) is solved for each coal-fired
generator that retired in the U.S. between 2009 and 2015. To identify coal-fired generators
that retired as of 2015, we utilized the EIA’s 860 data on existing generators. This data
identifies generators that retired each year on a cumulative basis. Most retirements in the
U.S. as of 2015 occurred in the Northeast, Southeast, and parts of the Midwest (Figure 2.1).
7

Upwind finite difference approximations were used to construct a linear spline, which approximates the
unknown value function. We used Matlab along with the CompEcon Toolbox and the smoothing-Newton
root finding method to solve the resulting complementarity problem. The approximated state space ranges
from 0 to 15 in the PC dimension with n = 50 nodal points and from 0 to 150 in the PE dimension with
m = 150 nodal points. Extending the state space in either the PC (t) or PE (t) dimension or increasing the
number of nodal points beyond 50 and 150 did not alter our general results.
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Figure 2.1: Retired vs. Operable Coal Generators
We targeted generators that used some form of coal as their stated main energy source for
generation.8
We started with a total of 485 retired coal generators as of 2015, restricting retired coal
generators to those that have a primary purpose North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) code of 22: electric power generation, transmission, and distribution. For
example, the U S Alliance Coosa Pines coal plant retired in 2008, but its sole purpose was
to provide electricity for a paper plant. This restriction eliminated generators that produced
electricity but were never connected to the electricity grid and dropped the total number
of retired coal generators by 77 generators. Uncertainty in electricity and coal prices would
play a much smaller role in the decision to retire coal generators not connected to the grid.
A total of 386 coal generators with a primary purpose of electric power generation were
reported as retired in the EIA 860 data as of 2015. Of those, over 86% occurred after 2005
8

Coal includes anthracite, bituminous, lignite, sub-bituminous, waste, refined, and coal-derived synthesis

gas.
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and almost 26% happened in 2015. We restricted our analysis to coal-fired generators that
retired after 2005 because we did not have electricity price data for years prior. In the end,
336 retired coal generators were left in our analysis.
Estimates of the parameters included in (2.3) and (2.4) are required to approximate
V (PE , PC ) over a subset of the state space. While estimating the parameters found in
(2.3) and (2.4), we dropped generators that did not have coal or electricity price data that
overlapped or used steam load for electricity generation.9 We also dropped one generator
due to lack of data that prevented us from confirming that coal prices delivered to that
generator followed geometric mean reversion. We were left with a total of 199 coal generator
retirements between 2009 and 2015. Of that total, 56 were in deregulated electricity markets,
and the other 143 were in a regulated market. We calibrated the model for each individual
coal generator. We followed [55] and assumed firms used a 9% discount rate, δ = 0.09.
Electricity and Coal Prices
A critical step in solving the optimal stopping model is defining firm expectations over
electricity prices (PE ) and coal prices (PC ). Coal price and quantity data for plants in our
analysis came from the EIA’s 923 database, which includes information on monthly fuel
receipts such as the quantity and price of fuel delivered to a plant. Since an electricity plant
can have more than one fuel delivery per month, we used a weighted average of the fuelspecific quantity and price delivered each month to compile monthly fuel prices ($/MMBtu).
Delivered fuel quantities do not accurately describe the fuel used in electricity generation on
a monthly basis. Often plants have coal stockpiles, so the quantity of coal delivered to the
plant is not all used in the month in which it was delivered.
Real options results critically depend on choosing the correct stochastic process [112].
That process may be one where the price follows a random walk with drift, like geometric
Brownian motion, or one where the price reverts back to a trend line, like GMR. Prices that
9

Of the 336 retired coal generators, 16 reported steam load instead of gross load. Steam load is the rate
of steam pressure generated by a unit or source produced by combusting a given heat input of fuel, whereas
gross load is the rate of electrical generation of a unit or source produced by combusting a given heat input
of fuel. Depending on the generator’s technology, it will produce either electrical output or steam output.
These two groups are distinctly different, so we focused our attention on generators with electrical output
only (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: Average Coal-Fired Generator Parameters by Market Type
Description
Coal Price Rate of Reversion

Parameter
rP C

Correlation Coefficient

ρ

Quantity of Electricity

qE

Quantity of Coal

qC

Discount Rate

δ

Regulated
10.21%
(6.36)
$3.33 per MMBtu
(1.05)
9.88%
(5.42)
1.81%
(0.68)
$11.53 per MMBtu
(2.43)
18.37%
(5.24)
−25.5%
(36.97)
qE = 17, 066PE
(16, 566)
qC = 3.07qE
(0.39)
9.00%

Variable Costs

V C(qE )

V C = 2.35qE

V C = 2.35qE

FC

F C = 17.58q¯C

F C = 17.58q¯C

Coal Price Long-Run Mean

P¯C

Coal Price Volatility

σ PC

Electricity Price Rate of Reversion

rPE

Electricity Price Long-Run Mean

P¯E

Electricity Price Volatility

σPE

Fixed Costs
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Deregulated
12.85%
(17.70)
$2.84 per MMBtu
(0.52)
11.88%
(8.13)
1.84%
(0.38)
$13.06 per MMBtu
(2.59)
23.28%
(6.18)
−34.36%
(33.71)
qE = 21, 326PE
(21, 124)
qC = 2.98qE
(0.29)
9.00%

statistically follow GMR would not be consistent with geometric Brownian motion. Unit
root tests provide a platform to determine whether a time series follows a random walk. An
augmented Dickey Fuller test was used to check the GMR assumptions for coal prices. We
rejected the null hypothesis that the price process follows geometric Brownian motion for
each generator in the study (Appendix 2).
With empirical support for our geometric mean reversion assumption, we follow [86]
to estimate rPC , P¯C , and σPC using data from 2002-2015 (Appendix 2). The coal-fired
generators that retired in a regulated market experienced, on average, less volatile but higher
coal prices than those in deregulated markets. The average long-run mean coal price is
$3.33 per MMBtu for regulated coal generators and $2.84 for the retired coal generators in

deregulated markets. Average coal price volatility is 9.88% for regulated markets and 11.88%
for deregulated markets. The average rate of reversion to the mean coal price across regulated
coal generators is 10.21% and 12.85% for deregulated coal generators. Coal generators that
retired in a deregulated market have coal prices that revert back to the long-run mean over
25% faster than their counterparts in a regulated market.
Firm expectations of electricity prices are calculated using historic data on wholesale
electricity prices ($ per MMBtu). For retired coal generators whose balancing authority is
PJM, we used the monthly PJM zonal wholesale electricity price data to estimate parameters
for dPC . For all other retired coal generators, we used FERC Form 714 hourly system lambda
electricity prices by balancing authority area aggregated to the monthly level. Again, we
checked the GMR assumption for electricity prices with unit root tests and rejected that
they follow Brownian motion for each balancing authority and PJM zone in our analysis (see
Appendix 2). Parameters for rPE , P¯E , and σPE were estimated following Pachamanova and
Fabozzi (2011) for the calculations (Appendix 2). Since the electricity price data were either
at the balancing authority level or the PJM zone level, the parameters for dPE are the same
for generators within the same balancing authority or PJM zone. Unlike coal prices, the
generators that retired in a regulated market experienced, on average, lower but less volatile
electricity prices than those in deregulated markets. Retired coal-fired generators received
average long-run electricity prices of $11.53 per MMBtu in regulated markets and $13.06
per MMBtu in deregulated markets. The average volatility of electricity prices experienced
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Figure 2.2: Expected and Stochastic Paths for Coal and Electricity Prices. The expected
and stochastic paths are simulated using the average dPE (Panel A) parameters and dPC
(Panel B) for all generators.
by generators in regulated and deregulated markets is 18.37% and is 23.28%. On average,
electricity prices revert back to the long-run mean in regulated and deregulated markets at
approximately the same rate.
Electricity prices are much more volatile than coal prices (Figure 2.2).10

The thin

horizontal line represents the expected path of electricity prices (Panel A) and coal prices
(Panel B) for regulated coal generators given the parameters described above. The dashed,
dotted, and thick line represent three possible price paths over the next 13 years. The real
options approach captures the effect of the volatility shown in both graphs on the retirement
option value.
Because coal is used as an input in electricity generation, there is a clear link between
coal and electricity prices. To capture this relationship between the two stochastic processes,
we used the cross-correlation function of the two time series discussed above to calculate the
correlation between coal prices and electricity prices. The average correlation coefficient for
retired coal generators in regulated markets is -0.26 between their levels. In deregulated
markets, it is -0.34.
10

Using the same y-axis for both panels makes the difference between coal price volatility and electricity
price volatility appear more extreme.
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Electricity and Coal Quantities
The quantity of electricity and fuel at the generator level on a monthly basis is available
through the EPA’s Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems (CEMS). Electricity quantity
data are transformed from megawatt hour to millions of British thermal units. Coal quantity
data are reported in MMBtus. We collected monthly EPA CEMS data from 2000 to 2015.
Electricity supplied by a generator qE follows a simple linear supply function: qE =
βPE PE + . We utilized the EPA CEMS data on electricity quantity and the monthly
electricity price data described above to estimate the slope of each generator’s supply curve
using ordinary least squares regressions. We suppressed the constant so a generator would
not supply electricity if the price of electricity is zero. The average βPE for retired coal
generators in a regulated market is 17,066, and in a deregulated market, the average βPE
is 21,326. This means that for every 1 dollar per MMBtu increase in electricity prices, the
quantity of electricity supplied increases by either 17,066 MMBtus or 21,326 MMBtus. To
put that number into context, it takes around 0.064 MMBtus to increase the temperature in
a 1600 square foot home with 10 feet ceilings by 50 degrees Fahrenheit. If that house were
located in Knoxville, Tennessee, during the winter, it would take only 0.064 MMBtus to heat
the home to 70 degrees from 20 degrees. This means that the average quantity of electricity
supplied by the retired coal generators in our analysis is highly responsive to changes in
electricity prices.
Because coal units are used to generate baseload electricity, owners of coal-fired units
seek to minimize the cost of supplying electricity. This means the quantity of electricity
generated and the efficiency of the generation technology determines the amount of fuel
used. To capture generator technology and efficiency, we used a simple ordinary least squares
regression with EPA CEMS data on electricity quantity and fuel quantity (in MMBtus):
qC = βqE qE + . Suppressing the constant eliminates the ability of a generator to create
electricity without using any coal. This relationship is representative of an inverse production
function. The higher βqE , the less efficient is the unit. For example, a coefficient of 3 for
βqE means that a 1 MMBtu increase in electricity requires 3 additional MMBtus of coal,
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Figure 2.3: Coal Generator Technological Efficiency by Operational Year.
whereas a coefficient of 1 describes a generator that produces the same additional MMBtu
of electricity with 2 fewer MMBtus of coal.
An important factor for coal generator retirements is the age of the generator. We were
able to account for the effect of age on retirement through βqE (Figure 2.3). The slope of
the inverse production function for each generator mapped against the first operational year
of the generator. The negative slope shows that more efficient generators (small βqE ) are
associated with younger generators. The average efficiency for retired coal generators in our
analysis is 3.07 for those in a regulated market and 2.98 in deregulated markets.
Fixed and Variable Costs
Electricity producers face fixed costs (e.g., capital costs, financing costs) and variable or
O&M costs (e.g., fuel, labor, maintenance). According to the EIA, the average operating
and maintenance expenses (without fuel) for fossil steam generators between 2005 and 2015
is $2.35 per MMBtu. The total variable costs associated with each generator in our model
is V C = 2.35qE .
We assert that the fixed costs associated with operating a coal-fired generator are equal to
the levelized capital costs. Levelized capital costs are calculated by taking the total capital

41

costs and dividing by the total life of the generator in terms of megawatts of electricity
generated. A coal-fired generator that is still operating incurs these levelized capital costs
over its productive life (until it retires).
Each year the EIA publishes estimates of levelized costs of electricity for new generation
in the Annual Energy Outlook. We took the projected levelized capital costs portion of the
estimates for new generation resources in 2019 for conventional coal and transformed it into
dollars per MMBtu [116]. The per unit levelized capital costs are $17.58 per MMBtu. Each
generator’s fixed costs are found by multiplying the per unit levelized capital cost by the
average quantity of coal (in MMBtus) used in electricity generation from the EPA CEMS
data described above: F C = 17.58q¯C .

2.3

Retirement Cost Analysis

Data on the costs of retiring a coal generator, K, are scarce due to their proprietary nature.
Furthermore, retirement costs vary depending on the level of decommission the firm chooses
for a generator [123, 54]. If the site is going to be reused for other operations at the power
plant, decommission includes removal of equipment and hazardous materials associated with
generation. In some cases, full remediation is necessary. The cost and extent of cleanup of
hazardous materials depends on the anticipated reuse of the site and the type and location
of hazardous materials stored or disposed on the property. If this is the only or last coal
generator at the plant, then plants with onsite coal ash ponds or solid waste landfills must
follow federal and state permit requirements for closure. The firm can also choose to leave
the generator intact and simply maintain environmental permits. Retired generators can be
removed and used at other locations the firm owns or sold as scrap.
A variety of news articles and technical reports have published estimates of retirement
costs ranging from $4.1 million [54] to $150 million [43]. If a firm’s retirement decisions are
consistent with real options theory, we can back out an estimate of the retirement costs that
justified retiring each generator in our analysis. To do this, we find the electricity price and
coal price for the month in which each generator retired (or from the last fuel delivery made
to the plant) and compare it to retirement thresholds representative of different retirement
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costs.11 Because coal prices do not vary considerably over our time frame, it is unlikely that
using the last coal price for each generator will lead to unreliable estimates of K.
The retirement thresholds, PER (PC ), for two randomly selected coal-fired generators are
the solution to the optimal stopping problem in (2.3) and (2.4) with specific parameter values
(Figure 2.4, Table 2.2). These thresholds represent retirement rules for each coal generator
in our analysis whose retirement costs are fully sunk and expectations of electricity prices
and coal prices are based on historic data. If the current electricity and coal prices are below
a retirement threshold, it is optimal for a firm to retire that generator. Every combination
of prices above the threshold is in the continuation region, that is the point at which it is
optimal for the generator to remain operational. As expected, retirement becomes optimal
when electricity prices fall. How far electricity prices must fall to trigger retirement depends
on how much the firm is paying for coal at that generator. Firms will choose to retire a unit
at a higher electricity price if they are faced with higher coal prices (a rightward movement
along the x-axis); thus, retirement thresholds are upward sloping. A critical retirement cost,
K = K ∗ , is found when a retirement threshold goes from being above the electricity-coal
price pair from the month-year in which a generator retired (where the firm would find it
optimal to retire the unit) to just below the electricity-coal price pair (where the firm would
find it optimal to continue operating the generator). To identify K ∗ for each generator, we
varied retirement costs from $0 to $160 million in $500 thousand increments.
The black lines in Figure 2.4 represent retirement thresholds when electricity and coal
price volatility is present. The dashed lines are the retirement thresholds without any
volatility. The points identify the prevailing electricity prices and coal prices for the month
in which each generator retired. Accounting for electricity and coal price uncertainty is
important in determining the optimal retirement decision (Figure 2.4). Eliminating the two
sources of uncertainty that generators face (the dashed line), a firm would retire the right
11

One drawback in using the month and year in which a generator retired for coal prices is that plants
often receive their last coal delivery months before the generator is technically considered retired. Therefore,
it may not be possible observe the coal price for the month in which a generator retires. If a plant operates
multiple coal generators and only a subset of these retire, this problem is moot; that plant still receives coal
deliveries after the retired generator(s) drops out, meaning the coal price for coal delivered to the plant for
use in the remaining operational generators, including the month in which the retired generator(s) leaves
the sample. We can use either the coal price from the last delivery made to a plant or the coal price for the
month in which a generator retired.
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Figure 2.4: Retirement Thresholds for Two Random Generators with and without
Electricity and Coal Price Volatility

Table 2.2: Parameter Values for Two Randomly Selected Generators
Description
Parameter
Coal Price Rate of Reversion
rP C
Coal Price Long-Run Mean
P¯C
Coal Price Volatility
σ PC
Electricity Price Rate of Reversion
rP E
Electricity Price Long-Run Mean
P¯E
Electricity Price Volatility
σ PE
Correlation Coefficient
ρ
Quantity of Electricity
qE
Quantity of Coal
qC
Discount Rate
δ
Variable Costs
V C(qE )
Fixed Costs
FC
Critical Sunk Cost
K∗
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Left Graph
97.70%
$2.38 per MMBtu
34.50%
2.54%
$9.09 per MMBtu
13.20%
−37.87%
qE = 16, 350PE
qC = 3.09qE
9.00%
V C = 2.35qE
F C = 17.58q¯C
$20 million

Right Graph
2.80%
$3.93 per MMBtu
10.70%
1.40%
$16.35 per MMBtu
34.20%
59.09%
qE = 21, 533PE
qC = 2.82qE
9.00%
V C = 2.35qE
F C = 17.58q¯C
$45.5 million

generator at electricity and coal prices much higher than is prescribed by real options theory
(the black line). Because there is a positive benefit to delaying retirement (the option value)
due to price uncertainty, the black line lies below the dashed line. Real options theory tells us
that larger drops in electricity prices are necessary to drive a generator into retirement when
those prices are uncertain. The estimates of implied retirement costs are inclusive of the
retirement option value. If we did not consider electricity and coal price uncertainty in our
analysis, we would over-estimate the implied critical retirement costs. Electricity and coal
price volatility have heterogeneous effects across generators (Figure 2.4). The generator’s
retirement thresholds on the left show minimal changes in the presence of price volatility
compared to no volatility.
Figure 2.5 shows the frequency distribution of implied retirement costs across the 199
retired coal-fired generators in our study.

The gray (black) bars show the number of

deregulated (regulated) coal generators that have retirement costs in each bin. Over 93%
of the 199 retired coal generators have critical K values less than $80 million. Eight coal
generators (five in regulated markets) have critical retirement costs equal to $0. The barriers
to retirement were the lowest for these eight coal generators; plant managers had to pay
nothing to pull those generators out of the market. On the other end of the distribution, for
the most part coal generators that retired in a regulated market have the highest retirement
costs. We estimated that the largest coal generator at Widows Creek coal plant in Alabama
had the largest retirement costs in our sample, totaling over $150 million when it retired.
The distribution of critical K values is skewed to the left and takes the general shape of
a logistic distribution for generators that retired in either market type. The K ∗ distribution
for regulated coal generators that retired between 2009 and 2015 appears to have a long right
tail, and a large mass at $30-$40 million. The retirement cost distribution for coal generators
that retired in a deregulated electricity market is similar to that of their counterparts, but the
highest frequency of retirement costs occurs between $10-$20 million. The weighted average
of retirement costs for all coal generators in our analysis is $37.35 million. The retirement
costs are a barrier to exit for coal-fired generators and hold potentially informative signals
about the likelihood of coal-fired generator retirements (Figure 2.5). In the following section,
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Figure 2.5: Retirement Cost Distribution by Market Type
we quantified the improvements in generator retirement prediction afforded by retirement
cost estimates.

2.4

Empirical Analysis

We developed a procedure to estimate the retirement costs at active coal-fired generators
based on the imputed retirement costs from the real options model described above. Using
the data needed to estimate retirement costs, as well as the matching procedure used to
generate a sample with common support across retired and active generators, we estimated
retirement costs for active plants. While some utilities may have assessed these costs for
some of their coal-fired generators, that information is not public.12
The result demonstrates that the estimated retirement costs are reasonable and that
those retirement costs can be an important input into determining which generators are
likely to retire.

Analyzing how the retirement costs, derived from fuel and electricity

prices, impact actual retirement decisions indicates that our estimated retirement costs
contribute to explaining retirement decisions even after controlling for generator observables,
12

Anecdotally, much of the costs of retiring these generators is unknown even to their owners until they
begin the process of evaluating their capacity needs and consider retiring plants.
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local sociodemographics and natural gas prices. Simple back-of-the-envelope counterfactual
analysis demonstrates the importance of considering retirement costs when predicting the
exit of coal fired generators.

2.4.1

Data

Several different data sets were used to estimate the probability of retirement for active coal
generators. Generator characteristics from EIA 860 data, local area information from the
census, pollution emissions from EPA CEMS data, and fuel prices from EIA build an electric
generator panel by the month.13 The EIA 860 data contains unique identifiers that can be
used to link EIA and EPA generator records. Both data sets include the geographic location
of the generator, which allowed us to combine generator characteristic data with data from
the 2000 Census on the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities where generators
were located. We used the 2000 census, rather than contemporaneous data, in order to
avoid conflating the impacts of a generator retirement on the sociodemographic status of a
county with the impact of the county’s sociodemographics on the retirement decision. FERC
Form 423 collects monthly data on the electric power price of natural gas and is included
this analysis to account for cheaper and more competitive natural gas brought about by the
hydraulic fracturing boom in the U.S. (Table 2.3).

13

Most coal-fired power plants are made up of multiple electric generators. The mean plant in our sample
had 3.4 coal-fired generators. Generators can be retired separately or taken down in groups as part of a
plant retirement.
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Table 2.3: Data Dictionary
Variable

Description

Source

Retire
Retirement Costs

Indicator for retired generators
Imputed cost to retire generator

EIA 860
Imputed from real
options model
EIA 860
EIA 860
EIA 860

Efficiency (100%)
Generator efficiency when operating at full capacity
Nameplate Cap (MW) Generator reported nameplate capacity
Regulated
Indicator for generator in a regulated
wholesale electricity market
Ash Impoundment
Indicator for a generator with an ash impoundment
Nonattain
Indicator for a generator located in a county that is regulated
under the Clean Air Act for any pollutant
Mercury Control
Indicator for a generator with mercury abatement
technology installed in 2009
Median Income
Median county income
Pop. Density
Population Density (pop/sq. mile)
Unemployment Rate
County unemployment rate
Male Higher Ed.
Fraction of males with at least a college degree
Female Higher Ed.
Fraction of females with at least a college degree
Lagged Gas Price
Annual average electric power price for
natural gas price lagged 12 months
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EIA 860
EIA 860
EIA 860
2000 Census
2000 Census
2000 Census
2000 Census
2000 Census
FERC 423

2.4.2

Estimate Retirement Costs for Active Plants

This section describes the procedure for estimating retirement costs for active generators
from the real option model’s imputed retirement cost for retired plants. In order to impute
the retirement costs described previously, it is important to know the electricity and coal
prices for the month in which each generator retires. Because active generators have not yet
retired, this information was not available. Thus, we employed propensity score matching to
assign retirement costs to operating generators based on a host of observable characteristics.
The propensity score is the conditional probability that any generator retires, given the
observed generator specific characteristics and sociodemographic characteristics. Specifically,
we matched retired coal generators to operating generators based on the variables (except
lagged gas price) as well as operational year, utilization rate for 2007, electricity price
parameters, coal price parameters, and the total cost of existing abatement technology (Table
2.3). Data on year operational and the total cost of existing abatement technology come
from EIA 860.14 Electricity and coal price parameters were calculated for active generators
in the same way as described for the real options analysis above from wholesale electricity
prices reported by FERC and PJM and from fuel delivery prices and quantities reported by
EIA. The utilization rate for 2007 was calculated by taking the total grossload generated
in 2007 (EPA CEMS data) and dividing it by the total capacity (EIA 860) that generator
could have produced in a year if it operated at 100% every day of 2007.
The probability that each generator retires were estimated as a function of the variables
just described using a logit regression. Propensity scores were calculated as the estimated
probability of retiring. Each retired coal generator was matched to an active generator with
the closest propensity score. We allowed for matching with replacement in order to reduce
the sample size by more than half. For each matched pair, the imputed retirement costs of
the retired coal generators was assigned to the matched active generator. The distribution
of retirement costs for retired and operating coal generators as of 2015 indicated that coal
generators that retired have a large mass where retirement costs are low, and operating coal
14

The total cost of existing abatement technology is reported in the EIA Form 860 in nominal dollars. We
used the producer price index reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to convert nominal dollars
into real 1982 dollars.
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Figure 2.6: Retirement Cost Density
generators have much higher retirement costs (Figure 2.6). This is consistent if active coal
generators face higher barriers to exit because the costs of retiring are high.
For reference, the logit model of the probability of each generator retiring takes the form
0

eβ X
Pr(Retireit = 1) =
1 + eβ 0 X

(2.5)

where Retireit = 1 if generator i retires in time t and is zero otherwise, and X is a matrix of
the generator and sociodemographic variables mentioned previously. We used the matched
imputed retirement costs in a separate analysis to determine the impact of sunk costs on
coal generator retirement.

2.4.3

Analysis of Estimated Retirement Costs

We began by estimating the probability of retirement for each generator in the sample as
a function of o imputed retirement costs, generator and local area characteristics. The
estimation procedure is:

50

Logit[P rob(Retireist = 1)] = αRetireCosti +βGenCharit +γCensusi +θGast +δs +ζm +ηy +eist
(2.6)
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a specific generator (i ) is retired in
time period t. RetireCosti is the imputed retirement cost described above, and the parameter
α measures how changes in retirement cost affect the probability of retirement all else equal.
GenChar is a matrix of generator characteristics including the efficiency of the generator and
the nameplate capacity. The GenChar matrix also includes separate indicators for whether
the generator is in a regulated wholesale electricity market, has an ash impoundment, has
mercury controls, and is in a county that is in non-attainment for any criteria pollution
for any year during the sample period. Local sociodemographic conditions may play a role
in an operator’s decision to retire a generator. For that reason we also included a matrix
of variables from the census measured at the county level. The variables include median
income, population density, unemployment rate, and the percentage of males and females
with bachelor’s degrees or higher. We also included lagged natural gas prices to measure
competition from other fuel types. Last, we included state (δs ), month of year (ζm ), and
year of sample (ηy ) fixed effects.15
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 2.4. Column 1 reports a univariate
regression of our imputed retirement costs on the probability of retirement. We found
that increases in retirement cost are associated with a reduced probability of retirement,
which is evidence that the imputed retirement costs are good proxies for actual retirement
costs.

In Column 2 state, month, and year fixed effects add to the specification to

control for unobserved spatial, seasonal, and time confounds. The estimated impact of
retirement costs on the probability of retirement does not change. Column 3 adds generator
characteristics; larger generators with ash impoundments are less likely to be retired.
Including these generator characteristics moderates the relationship between the imputed
retirement cost measure and the probability of retiring somewhat. Column 4 adds county
15

We did not include the same variables used in the propensity score matching procedure due to
multicollinearity issues. For example, the total cost of existing abatement technology and the indicator
for having an ash impoundment measure a generator’s level of abatement and are highly correlated.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of the Probability of Retirement
1

2

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.02***
(0.00)

Constant

-1.12***
(0.19)

-0.93
(0.85)

Month FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

State FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.086
43,056

0.342
43,056

0.462
43,056

0.470
43,056

0.471
43,056

Retirement Costs
Efficiency(100%)
Nameplate Cap (MW)
Regulated
Ash Impoundment
Nonattainment
Mercury Control
Median Income
Pop. Density
Unemployment Rate
Male Higher Ed.
Female Higher Ed.
Lagged Gas Price

Pseudo R2
Observations

3

4

5

-0.01** -0.01** -0.01**
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
16.60
13.05
13.11
(13.57)
(14.92)
(14.94)
-0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.59
-0.76
-0.76
(0.61)
(0.61)
(0.61)
-2.41*** -1.89*** -1.89***
(0.58)
(0.55)
(0.55)
0.29
-0.05
-0.05
(0.43)
(0.47)
(0.47)
0.42
0.78*
0.78*
(0.47)
(0.47)
(0.47)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-142.13 -139.82
(877.47) (878.27)
17.18
17.12
(46.43)
(46.45)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
-0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.15**
(0.06)
-11.55
-10.62
-9.76
(11.73)
(12.70)
(12.68)

Note: The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator equal to 1 if the coal fired generator was
retired in that month. Retirement costs were imputed from a real options model as described above.
Nameplate capacity through mercury control are generator characteristics collected from EIA 860 data.
Median income through female higher education are for the generator’s county collected from the 2000
census. Lagged gas prices are monthly national average electric power prices for natural gas as reported by
EIA lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered at the plant level are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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level sociodemographics to the estimation. We found no strong relationship between county
characteristics and the probability of generator retirement. Finally, Column 5 adds natural
gas prices lagged six months to the estimation. The coefficient is negative, statistically
significant, and large in magnitude, suggesting that low natural gas prices increase the
probability of retirement.
The impact of estimated retirement costs on the probability of retirement are consistently
negative and statistically significant, which holds true even after including a number of the
controls used in the estimation of the retirement costs at active generators. This can be
considered to be reassuring suggestive evidence that the estimated retirement costs are a good
proxy for the actual retirement costs faced by the owners of coal-fired electric generators.
Including logit coefficients means the marginal effects of changes in retirement costs are
not obvious. To facilitate interpretation of these coefficients, the estimated marginal effect
of retirement costs on the probability a coal-fired generator retires is reported across the
support of estimated retirement costs (Figure 2.7). The marginal effects of increases in
retirement costs are negative across the distribution, but less precisely estimated at low
levels of retirement costs. There is a small reduction in the magnitude of the marginal effect
of increases in retirement costs on the probability of retirement, but any single ten million
increase is not significantly different from the previous. The mean retirement cost across the
sample is $71.6 million and the standard deviation is $45 million. A one standard deviation
increase in retirement cost from the mean is associated with an increase in retirement
probability of 0.2%.
The logit estimation described above can generate a predicted probability of generator
retirement for all the remaining active generators in the sample. We captured predicted values from the logit estimation presented in Column 3, which includes generator characteristics
and fixed effects but not county sociodemographics or fuel prices. The density for retired
generators includes all generators that retire during our sample period (Figure 2.8). The
operating generator density was estimated on a sample of generators identified as similar to
the retired generators across the observable generator and county characteristics reported in
the previous section. The operating generators’ retirement probabilities are clustered at low
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Figure 2.7: Marginal Effect of Retirement Costs
Note: This figure reports the marginal effect of an increase in estimated retirement costs on the probability
of retirement as estimated from the logit reported in Column 5 of Table 2.4. The vertical lines represent
the 95% confidence interval for that marginal effect estimate. The horizontal axis is measured in millions of
dollars. The vertical axis is the marginal effect of retirement costs on the probability of retirement. This is
estimated at every $10 million interval from $0 to $150 million.
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Figure 2.8: Predicted Retirement Density
Note: This figure reports two separate density regressions of the predicted value of retirement: one for
generators that retired during our sample period, and a second for generators that survived throughout the
sample. All generators that retired during the sample are included in the density of the probability of
retirement for retired generators. The operating generators are limited to those that match across
observables to generators that retired during the sample period described above.
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probabilities. The distribution of retired plants is much more even with a tail of probabilities
that are beyond the highest estimated probability for active generators.
As a test of the model’s predictive power, we estimated a logit regression using all the
variables included in the propensity score matching analysis, as well as retirement costs,
and captured the residuals. The residuals represent the predicted probability of retirement
for each generator in our analysis. As expected, the generators with the highest predicted
probability of retirement are those that in fact retired. More important are the active coal
generators with the highest predicted probability of retirement. We compared the top 20
active coal generators with the highest predicted probability of retirement to EIA Form 860’s
preliminary data on electricity generator retirements for 2016. Of the top 20 retirements
predicted based on this analysis, almost half of them did in fact retire in 2016.
To isolate the predictive power of retirement costs, we estimated the same logit regression
without retirement costs and collected the residuals. Using those predicted probabilities of
retirement, we found the top 20 active coal generators with the highest predicted probability
of retirement. They are not the same as those when we included retirement costs, which
leads to the conclusion that predicted retirements for active coal generators predicts even
fewer actual retirements that occurred in 2016.

2.5

Conclusion

Coal-fired generators have been retiring at an increasing rate since 2009. These retirements
have shifted the electricity generation portfolio across the country. In 2015, natural gas
surpassed coal as the primary fuel source for electricity generation. This shift has multiple
consequences for the economy (increases in unemployment in part of the country reliant on
coal production) and the environment (reduction in carbon dioxide emissions produced by
the electricity sector). Given the impacts of these shifts in electricity generation, economic
analyses are needed to understand the drivers of these retirement decisions. This study
explored how the sunk costs associated with retiring a coal generator impact the probability
of retirement.
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The costs associated with retiring electricity generators are scarcely reported and not
publicly available. Instead of proxying for retiring costs with variables used in the past,
like the amount of non-depreciated capital, we estimated the retirement costs for almost
200 coal generators that retired between 2009 and 2015 by using a real options model.
We matched imputed retirement costs for retired coal generators to active generators using
propensity score matching on observable generator and sociodemographic characteristics
and then estimated a logistic regression to determine the impact of sunk retirement costs
on the probability of retirement. Our results indicate the significant impact retirement costs
have in determining market exit for coal generators in the U.S. Furthermore, accounting for
retirement costs improves our ability to accurately predict coal generator retirements that
occurred in 2016.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to back out estimates of sunk costs
of market exit. The retirement decision of the average generator in our study is consistent
with retirement costs greater than $37 million. Retirement costs vary across regulated and
deregulated markets, across plants within the same market, and within plants. Matching
retirement costs of retired generators to active generators indicates that the existing coal
fleet still operating in the U.S. have retirement costs greater than $100 million.
Future applications of our real options model and subsequent empirical analysis include
incorporating changes in environmental regulation. For example, our framework provides us
the opportunity to add environmental regulation like a carbon tax and determine the set
of existing coal generators that have the highest risk of being pushed out of the electricity
market. Another application would be to create a counterfactual world in which the hydraulic
fracturing boom never happened in order to determine whether the coal generators that have
already retired would still be operating today. We leave these topics to future research.
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Chapter 3
Abate or Exit? The Impact of
Mercury Regulation on Coal
Generator Retirements
3.1

Introduction

Air emissions have been regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) since
the passage of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970. Hazardous air pollutants or air toxics
are known to be or suspected of causing serious health effects and include mercury, arsenic,
chromium, nickel, hydrochloric acid, and hydrofluoric acid. The electric power sector, and
coal power generation in particular, has been the largest source of mercury air emissions
in the United States since the 1990s [78], but it was not until December 2000 that the
EPA deemed it “appropriate and necessary” to regulate fossil fuel-fired electric generating
units (i.e. electricity generators) under the CAA.1 After the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated
the first attempt at mercury regulation, the EPA announced the Mercury and Air Toxics
Standards (MATS) in December 2011.2 The final rule establishes numerical emission limits
for mercury, particulate matter, and hydrochloric acid for all existing and new coal-fired
1

An electricity generator contains all the equipment needed to produce electricity and typically operates
independently. Electric power plants can include multiple electricity generators that can use different fuels.
2
A more complete history of mercury regulation in the U.S. is provided in the next section.
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electricity generators, which can be satisfied by implementing a range of technologies such
as wet and dry scrubbers, dry sorbent injection systems, activated carbon injection systems,
and fabric filters [122].
The federal government is not the only source of mercury regulation in the U.S. Twentyone states had adopted their own set of standards for power plant mercury emissions by the
time MATS was announced [79]. State mercury regulations were typically more stringent
than the federal regulation. Owners of coal-fired electricity generators had to choose between
investing in expensive abatement technology or retiring the generator in order to comply
with mercury regulation that was enacted at the state and federal levels from 2000 to
present.3 This papers investigates the impact of environmental regulation on coal generator
retirements in the U.S. Much of the existing literature has studied the effect of environmental
regulation on productivity [53, 13, 47, 104, 69, 12, 50, 103, 4] and location choices [11, 71, 130]
in the manufacturing and industrial sectors.4 The literature that examines the effect of
environmental regulation on exit decisions is considerably less extensive.5
[48] utilized the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 and 1977 and the Census of
Manufactures data to assign manufacturers into regulated and unregulated groups based
on their county’s regulatory status, their emissions of the regulated pollutant, and year.6
Identification relied on assigning 1.75 million plants to either a regulated group or
unregulated group based on the county in which the plant was located.

Each county

receives a pollutant-specific regulation designation every year that is determined by the
concentration of four controlled pollutants in their air that exceeds a set of national ambient
air quality standards. Many industries included in that analysis emitted multiple pollutants
and many counties were deemed to be high regulation for multiple pollutants, where a
county’s pollutant-specific regulatory status changed over time. As a result, the study
exploited cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in which plants were regulated and found
3

For the remainder of the paper, “mercury regulation” refers to both state and federal regulation of
mercury.
4
[32] provided a review of the empirical literature on the impacts of environmental regulation on firm
competitiveness. While the focus is on firm competitiveness, the article covers several additional outcomes.
5
This study categorizes coal generator retirements as a form of firm exit, where each generator is a unique
entity to be retired individually from a power plant.
6
[48] is a previous version of [49] that included a section dedicated to differential impacts on firm births,
deaths, and stayers.
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that after the Amendments became law, high regulation counties lost jobs, capital stock, and
output compared to low regulation counties.7 Decomposing those effects on births, deaths,
and stayers, [48] found that the CAA Amendments’ regulations by emission type significantly
reduced employment, investment, and shipments for each firm type. [109] used plant-level
data to econometrically evaluate the effect of environmental regulation on the adoption
and exit behavior of chlorine manufacturers and found that the impact of regulation on
technological change was due to the adoption of cleaner technologies at existing plants and
new plants, as well as the closing of facilities using older, dirtier technology. The results
indicate that regulatory factors have not had a significant effect on adoption for existing
plants. However, indirect regulation of the end-users of chlorine appears to have quickened
facility closures.
[72] analyzed how the CAA’s New Source Review (NSR) requirement impacted modification rates and closure rates in existing plants. Existing plants seeking to modify operations
are forced to bring the entire plant into pollution control compliance for new sources with the
NSR requirement. The study concluded that substantial modifications of existing pollutionintensive plants in nonattainment counties had been delayed and saw minimal closure rates
of existing dirty plants. [134] explored whether underground storage tank (UST) regulations
unevenly impacted petroleum retail outlets as well as the reasons that some outlets were
more likely to exit the market than others under UST regulations. This study considered
whether economies of scale or liquidity constraints could explain the asymmetric impact of
UST regulations on petroleum retail outlets. [80] provided a survey of the literature on the
effect of environmental regulation on market structure.
The current study differs from the previous literature in several ways. First, it focuses
on the impact of environmental regulation on a finer scale entity. Electric power plants
typically contain multiple electricity generators that can use various types of fuels to produce
electricity. It is more common for individual generators than an entire power plant to be
retired. The previous studies noted above papers explored effects at the manufacturing or
industrial plant level, whereas this study looks at retirement decisions for individual coal
7

High regulation counties are those in nonattainment based on the CAA. Those counties have air quality
worse than the National Ambient Air Quality Standards defined in the CAA.
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generators within a power plant, which can thus exploit within plant-level heterogeneity
that the previous literature overlooked. Second, this study examines the direct impact of
environmental regulation on coal generator exit. Greenstone (1998) and Snyder et al. (2003)
focused on the indirect impact of environmental regulation on plant exit, while List et al.
(2004) and Yin et al. (2007) emphasized environmental modifications and pathways for exit,
respectively. Additionally, the focus here is on a different type of environmental mercury
emission regulation that targets the electric power sector, not the manufacturing or industrial
sector.
The analytic sample consists of 1,201 retired and operating coal-fired electricity
generators in the U.S. The EPA anticipated approximately 1,100 existing coal generators
would be affected by MATS in December 2011 [122], but even as early as 2007, 18 states
had established mercury emission limits with an additional four states in the regulation
development stage [79].8 Many coal generators located in these states adopted mercury
control technologies before the federal regulation was announced by the EPA in 2011.
The earliest mercury regulation at the state or federal level was adopted in June 2003
by Connecticut. Therefore, any coal generator that had mercury abatement technology
before 2004 acts as a control group for comparison against the coal generators that were
forced to adopt abatement technology or retire due to mercury regulation.9 A total of 436
coal generators in the sample retired after the start of various state and federal mercury
regulations. There are two other potential reasons why these coal generators were pulled
offline indefinitely. First, natural gas prices have plummeted since the mid 2000s due to
technological advancements in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling making electricity
generation fueled by natural gas cost competitive relative to coal. Second, about 73% of
all coal-fired capacity was 30 years or older at the end of 2010 [114]. Coal generators that
8

The states with regulations already enacted in 2007 are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. Georgia, Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin
were in the proposal stage of mercury regulation at the time.
9
Because Connecticut enacted mercury regulation in June 2003, coal generators assigned to the control
group must have adopted abatement technology beforehand. No coal generators adopted abatement
technology in 2003. Therefore, all months in 2003 are designated as in the pre-regulation time period
to extend the pre-regulation observations.
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retired after the start of mercury regulations did so because they had come to the end of
their useful life.
In this case, environmental regulation targets coal- and oil-fired electricity generators
as they are the primary source of mercury emissions in the U.S. A consequence of such
regulation is the retirement of coal generators, where owners of such units have the option
to adopt abatement technology or retire the generator.

Results indicate that mercury

regulation increased the probability a coal generator was retired if it did not have abatement
technology before the start of regulation. However, when compared with a group of control
coal generators that already had the abatement technology before mercury regulation began,
the probability a coal generator was retired due to such regulation is muted. This indicates
that in the absence of mercury regulation, the probability a coal generator was retired is not
significantly different than the probability a coal generator was retired in the presence of
mercury regulation. Instead, cheap natural gas and the vintage of the generator contribute
to the probability that a coal generator is retired. Findings are informative for policymakers
seeking to understand the response of the electric power sector to environmental regulation.
If the goal of mercury regulation was to drive coal generators into retirement, then the
current set of policies are not successful. However, if the goal was to force coal generators
to adopt abatement technology, the policy could be seen as effective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview
of mercury regulation in the U.S. Section 3.3 describes the details of the data and empirical
method used, and Section 3.4 discusses the impact of MATS on coal generator retirement.
Extensions are provided in Section 3.5, which include multiple event study analyses. Lastly,
the paper concludes with a discussion and conclusion in Section 3.6.

3.2

Background on Mercury Regulation in the U.S.

As power plants operate, mercury remissions are released into the air. Once mercury from
the air settles in water sources, microorganisms transform it into methylmercury, which is a
highly toxic form that can build up in fish. The primary source of exposure to humans is
through eating contaminated fish, which is a main concern for women of childbearing age,
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unborn babies, and young children. Several studies have linked high levels of methylmercury
to damage to the developing nervous system [122]. A complete history of federal mercury
regulation in the U.S. can be found on the EPA’s website: https://www.epa.gov/mats/
history-mats-regulation. In addition, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) study
provides an overview of state mercury regulation as of February 2007. The summary here is
based wholly on [126] and [79], unless otherwise cited.

3.2.1

Federal Regulation History

Under the CAA, several steps must be taken by the EPA in order to regulate air toxics
emissions, like mercury, from power plants. Section 112 of the CAA was revised in 1990 to
require issuance of technology-based standards for major sources of hazardous air pollutant,
where “major sources” include stationary sources like power plants [127]. In October 1994,
the EPA entered a settlement agreement with Congress to complete a “Utility Air Toxics
Study.” The study was to reveal whether it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate
power plants under the CAA section 112. The EPA specifically reviewed mercury emissions
from power plants and other industrial sources as well as the health and environmental
impacts of such emissions, noting available control technologies. The findings were provided
to Congress in December 1997. Two months later, the EPA released its “Utility Air Toxics
Study” report to Congress, which considered not just mercury but all potential emissions
of toxic air pollutants. The EPA did find it “appropriate and necessary” to regulate coaland oil-fired electric utilities under the CAA’s section 112 and announced this finding in
December 2000.
The EPA’s finding under the “Utility Air Toxics Study” prompted a requirement for
the EPA to propose regulations to control such air toxics emissions. After going through
the typical proposal-to-rule steps, the EPA issued the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) in
March 2005. It is important to note that before the CAMR was issued, the EPA removed
coal- and oil-fired electricity generators from the Clean Air Act’s list of sources of hazardous
air pollutants, which are regulated under section 112 of the CAA. Instead, the CAMR was
issued under section 111 of the CAA. The key difference between section 111 and section
112 of the CAA is the following: section 111 establishes a mechanism for controlling air
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pollution from stationary sources, whereas section 112 establishes emission standards for
sources of hazardous air pollutants. The CAMR limited mercury emissions for new and
existing utilities by creating a voluntary market-based cap-and-trade program. The D.C.
Circuit vacated the CAMR in February 2008 for two reasons: (a) the EPA’s removal of
coal- and oil-fired electricity generators from the list of sources of hazardous air pollutants
inherently goes against section 112, which requires the EPA to make specific findings before
removing a source listed under section 112; the EPA conceded that it never made such
findings, and (b) because coal-fired electricity generators are listed sources under section
112, regulation of existing coal-fired electricity generators’ mercury emissions under section
111 is prohibited [113].
In December 2009, the EPA approved an Information Collection Request (ICR). The
ICR required all U.S. power plants with coal- or oil-fired electricity generators to submit
emissions information to the EPA for use in creating air toxics emissions standards. With
that information, the EPA proposed a rule in March 2011, which would eventually become
MATS, setting standards to limit mercury, acid gases, and other toxic pollutants from power
plants.

3.2.2

Current Federal Regulation

The rules contained in MATS are technology-based emissions limitation standards. Coaland oil-fired electricity generators with a capacity of 25 megawatts or greater are subject to
MATS [125].10 Existing sources had up to four years to comply, while three years are provided
under the CAA with a potential additional year granted by state permitting authorities. The
first deadline for MATS was in April 2015, and the second, final deadline a year later. If
a coal generator did not adhere to MATS at that time, it was forced to retire. Figure 3.1
displays coal generator retirements mapped onto the historical timeline of MATS. The black
line tracks the number of coal generators that retired in each month from 1993-2016, and
the vertical lines represent landmarks in the history of mercury regulation in the U.S.11
10
11

Burning natural gas for electricity generation emits negligible amounts of mercury [124].
Figure 3.1 contains coal generators that were reported as “retired” in EIA Form 860 for 2016.
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Figure 3.1: Number of coal generator retirements between 1993 and 2016. Data are from
the Energy Information Administration Form 860 for 2016. A: EPA deemed it “appropriate
and necessary” to regulate coal generators, December 2000. B: Final CAMR issued, March
2005. C: D.C. Circuit vacated CAMR, February 2008. D: EPA proposes MATS, March
2011. E: Final MATS issued, December 2011. F: First MATS deadline, April 2015. G: Final
MATS deadline, April 2016.
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3.2.3

State Regulation Overview

By February 2007, 18 states had established mercury emission limits that would have taken
effect sooner than the EPA’s CAMR. Four other states were developing regulations that
would do the same: Georgia and Michigan adopted mercury regulations in 2007, Wisconsin
in 2008, and Washington in 2011. The effective date of the 18 states that adopted mercury
regulation by the time of the CRS study in 2007 ranged from 2007 to 2015. Most state
programs require reductions of 80% to 90% in mercury emissions once fully implemented,
which are more stringent than those of the CAMR. There is no documentation of a recent
examination of state mercury regulations, but the purpose of covering [79] is to highlight the
fact that states implemented their own mercury regulations during the study period.

3.3

Data and Methods

Electricity generator data are available from 1990 to present, which covers the time period
for which states and the federal government implemented mercury regulations. Therefore,
this study used a panel data model that mimics a difference-in-differences identification
to determine how owners of coal generators responded to the start of mercury emissions
regulation. All coal generators that had already adopted mercury abatement technology
before the start of the regulations served as the control group.12 For the purpose of this
study, mercury regulations started in 2003.13 Observations starting in 2004 were considered
to be within the treatment time frame, and observations before 2004 in the pre-treatment
time frame. There were no coal generators that installed mercury abatement technology in
2003, so there is no difference in specifying the treatment time frame in 2003 versus 2004.

3.3.1

Data

The EIA collects generator-level specific information about existing and retired generators as
well as their associated environmental equipment at electric power plants with 1 megawatt
12

Difference-in-differences models measure the difference in outcome over time for the treatment group
compared to the difference in outcome over time for the control group.
13
The start date is based on the year the regulation was adopted, not the year the regulation became
effective.
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or greater of combined nameplate capacity in their Form EIA-860 data [120]. Form EIA860 is comprehensive, meaning it contains static information on coal generators that retired
starting in 1990 up to the current release for 2016. The coal generator retirements with
this data, including the month and year of retirement, are identified for this study. Because
Form EIA-860 encompasses associated environmental equipment at the boiler level, it is
possible to ascertain the year in which a coal generator adopted mercury emissions abatement
technology.14 In addition, the form reports the total nominal cost of all existing abatement
technology and provides the year in which it was installed. The year a generator became
operational is documented in the same data, which permits calculations of each generator’s
age.
The EIA also collects detailed electric power data on monthly fuel receipts and costs at
the power plant level on their Form EIA-923. However, only data for generators operating in
a regulated wholesale electricity market are reported in the publicly available data.15 Form
EIA-923 supersedes Form EIA-423 and FERC-423 starting in 2008, where FERC stands
for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Coal prices for regulated electricity plants are
calculated by using a weighted average of the coal deliveries each month, weighted by the
quantity of coal for each delivery.16 Coal prices for plants operating in a deregulated wholesale
electricity market are indexed to the average monthly coal price by North American Electric
14

Each coal generator has at least one boiler attached to it. The electricity generating process is as follows.
Coal is burned within the boiler, which creates heat that turns water within the boiler’s pipe system into
steam. The steam reaches extremely high temperatures and pressure, which pushes against a turbine shaft.
The turbine shaft turns as a result of this pressure and spins the magnets within wire coils of a generator to
produce electricity [36]. Mercury abatement technology is associated with a boiler that is attached to a coal
generator. Form EIA-860 reports environmental equipment at the boiler level and provides a link between
boilers and generators.
15
Utilities that operate in regulated wholesale electricity markets are responsible for system operations
and management and for providing power to retail customers. They are typically vertically integrated in
that they own the generation, transmission, and distribution systems. In deregulated wholesale electricity
markets, independent system operators operate the transmission system independently of wholesale market
participants [128].
16
Regulated power plants do not receive fuel deliveries each month for coal; therefore, linear interpolation
is used to fill in missing data.
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Reliability Corporation (NERC) region.17 The same approach was used to calculate monthly
natural gas prices and monthly oil prices.18
To control for coal generator retirements driven by electricity prices, state-level average
retail electricity prices for all sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, transportation,
and other) at the monthly level were included the data came from the EIA’s Electricity
Data Browser. Other controls included changing yearly state-level natural gas- and oil-fired
electricity generator capacity, which came from the EIA’s Electric Power Annual.19 This
results in a total sample of 1,201 coal generators at 473 electric power plants with monthly
observations between 2001 and 2016 (Table 3.1).

17

Approximately 34.14% of the coal generators in the current sample operate in a deregulated wholesale
electricity market, thus NERC coal prices were used for those coal generators. Linear interpolation was used
for NERC regions with missing data. The Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC) does not have
coal prices for November and December of 2016.
18
NPCC does not have natural gas prices for 2001-2007. This matters for 38 (3.16% of the total) coal
generators, 32 of which are in the treatment group.
19
Capacity refers to the maximum amount of electricity a generator can produce in megawatts.
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Table 3.1: Data Dictionary
Variable

Description

Units

Retire
Mercury
Age
Age2
Total Abatement Cost
Coal Price
Natural Gas Price
Oil Price
Electricity Price
Natural Gas Capacity
Oil Capacity

Indicator for retired generators
1 or 0
Indicator for treatment generators
1 or 0
Difference between current year and generator birth
years
Age squared
years
Monthly installed cost of abatement technology
$1,000
Monthly delivered price of coal at a power plant
$ per MMBtu
Monthly delivered price of natural gas at a power plant $ per MMBtu
Monthly delivered price of oil at a power plant
$ per MMBtu
Monthly state average retail price of electricity
¢ per kWh
Yearly state existing nameplate capacity for natural gas MW
Yearly state existing nameplate capacity for oil
MW

Note: MMBtu stands for million British thermal units and is defined as the amount of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water
by one degree Fahrenheit. kWh stands for kilowatt hour is a composite unit of energy equivalent to one kilowatt of power sustained for one hour.
MW stands for megawatt and is one million watts, which is a unit of power.
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3.3.2

Empirical Strategy

The impact of mercury regulation on coal generator retirement decisions was determined by
estimating the following fixed effect model.

Retireipst = β0 + β1 M ercuryipst + Ppt + Cst + Xit + δt + δi + ipst

(3.1)

The dependent variable in Equation 3.1 is a binary indicator equal to one for a coal
generator i in plant p in state s in month t that is retired and zero otherwise. M ercuryipst is
a binary indicator equal to one for the treatment coal generators that retired after mercury
regulations began, all observations after 2003, and zero otherwise. Ppt contains controls
for variation in fuel prices across plants over time, including monthly coal prices, monthly
natural gas prices, and monthly oil prices. Cst includes controls for state-level variation
in monthly average retail prices of electricity, natural gas capacity, and oil capacity. Xit
contains generator controls, including the age of the generator, the age of the generator
squared, and the total abatement cost. δt and δi are time fixed effects and generator fixed
effects, respectively. All price and cost controls were converted to 2010 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index. Robust standard errors are clustered by electricity plant.
The coefficient of interest, β1 , describes the average treatment effect of mercury
regulation on generator retirement decisions. The main identification threat is unobserved
heterogeneous trends. More specifically, a potential concern is there might be another reason
for coal generator retirements that are coincident with the introduction of mercury regulation
programs. One potential driver of these coal generator retirements is more competitive
natural gas prices over the study period. Technological advances in hydraulic fracturing
and horizontal drilling made previously unrecoverable natural gas reserves recoverable in
shale formations. This led to the natural gas boom of the 2000s and, consequently, low
natural gas prices. Natural gas-fired electricity generation became cost competitive with
coal-fired electricity generation. This study addresses this concern by controlling for natural
gas prices received at the plant level over time as well as natural gas capacity at the state
level over time. Price variables account for the competitiveness of other fuel types, and
capacity variables control for changes in the quantity of electricity generation by fuel type.
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Using a difference-in-differences identification strategy assumes the control and treatment
generators have parallel pre-treatment trends. Section 3.5 presents an event study analysis
to confirm that this assumption is consistent with the data.
Because the outcome of interest is a binary indicator for whether a coal generator retired
or not, a standard procedure is to utilize a non-linear estimation procedure and assuming
a distribution for Retireipst , like a logistic or normal distribution. However, a growing
body of literature has pointed out a problem with utilizing a non-linear estimation approach
with interaction terms, such as a difference-in-differences setting [3, 98, 64]. M ercuryipst in
Equation 3.1 is an interaction term: the interaction between being a treatment or control
coal generator and whether the observation occurred before or after mercury regulation.
In short, the interaction effect of two independent variables is the cross-derivative of the
expected value of the dependent variable. In a linear model, the coefficient on the interaction
term, β1 , is exactly this interaction effect. The same is not true for non-linear models due to
the transformation of the dependent variable using a distribution bounded between 0 and 1.
[3] provided a clear explanation with mathematical examples using a probit and logit
model. [98] provided the calculation of the treatment effect in a nonlinear difference-indifferences model with a strictly monotonic transformation function. [64] extended the work
of [3] to difference-in-differences models, models with higher powers of explanatory variables,
other nonlinear models, and panel data models. This study utilized a linear probability model
in a difference-in-differences setting to avoid the issues described above. The main reluctance
to use a linear probability model is that is can lead to predictions outside the 0 to 1 range.
This is only a concern when looking at the coefficient on continuous covariates where the
linearity assumption matters. With dummy variables and their interactions, like Retireipst ,
the focus is on the mean differences between the treatment and control group, and hence, no
over- or under-prediction. However, when continuous covariates not bounded between 0 and
1 are introduced, the linear probability model can predict retirement probabilities outside
the 0 to 1 range.
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3.3.3

Descriptive Statistics

Summary statistics are presented separately for treatment (1,155) and control (46) coal
generators (Table 3.2).

Treatment and control generators are comparable in terms of

generator specific control variables as well as the outcome of interest, retirement. For the
last month in the panel data, treatment coal generators were slightly older than control
coal generators, where this difference is significant at the 10% level. Both age squared
and total abatement cost for December 2016 are not statistically different between the two
groups. Treatment and control generators face similar coal prices but encounter significantly
different natural gas and oil prices at the plant level. The same is true for state level average
retail electricity prices and oil capacity in the state, but natural gas capacity in a state for
December 2016 was similar for treatment and control coal generators.

3.4

Results

Equation 3.1 is estimated where the control group consists of coal generators that had
mercury abatement technology before the start of mercury regulation at either the federal or
state level, and the treatment group consisted of coal generators that had to adopt abatement
technology or retire due to various forms of mercury regulation. The data covers 1,201 coal
generators (1,155 treatment and 46 control) from 2001 to 2016 on a monthly time step and
is a strongly balanced panel. The results are shown in Table 3.3, and robust standard errors,
clustered by plant, are in parentheses. Column I lists the estimate of the effect of mercury
regulation on the probability of coal generator retirement without generator, plant, or state
controls. Columns II through IV add in each consecutive set of controls.
Estimates from the basic difference-in-differences model in Column I show that coal
generators without mercury abatement technology before regulation have a 0.09 percentage
point increase in the probability of retirement after mercury regulation relative to what
that probability would have been if that coal generator had already had mercury abatement
technology. Adding in generator controls (age, age squared, and total abatement costs)
removes all significance on the effect of mercury regulation on the probability of coal
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for generator outcome, generator controls, plant controls,
and state controls in December 2016
I
II
Treatment Generators Control Generators
Retire
Age
Age2
Total Abatement Cost
Coal Price
Natural Gas Price
Oil Price
Electricity Price
Natural Gas Capacity
Oil Capacity
Observations

0.37
(0.48)

0.28
(0.46)

48.00
(15.60)
2547.10
(1416.07)
194.96
(4887.16)

43.80
(19.19)
2279.20
(1892.98)
0
(0)

2.22
(0.40)
5.61
(2.43)
11.40
(0.70)

2.26
(0.34)
8.51
(10.13)
11.78
(0.72)

8.65
(1.21)
13022.86
(14655.35)
865.15
(1093.11)

9.43
(1.95)
13722.21
(10450.98)
1673.52
(1691.14)

1,155

46

Note: Columns I and II list the mean of generator outcome variable, generator controls, plant controls, and
state controls in December 2016 for treatment and control coal generators, respectively. All financial
variables are in 2010 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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generator retirement and lowers the size of the estimate. This holds with the addition
of plant and state controls.
An often cited reason for the retirement of coal generators in the 2000s and 2010s is
that most coal generators are old. Accounting for non-linear effects of age on coal generator
retirement probability reveals that when a coal generator is first operational, the probability
that it is retired decreases by 0.03 percentage points for an additional year of operation.
However, as that coal generator continues to age, the effect on the probability of retirement
switches signs, meaning that at some point, an additional year of operation increases the
probability that a coal generator is retired. Figure 3.2 displays this relationship between age
and the predicted probability of retirement from estimating Equation 3.1.20 This impact is
significant and consistent even after adding in plant and state controls.
Column III explores one other potential reason that coal generator retirements increased
during the study period. The hydraulic fracturing boom brought with it cheap natural gas
prices, which made electricity generation fueled by natural gas competitive with coal-fueled
generation. A $1 per MMBtu decrease in the price of natural gas is associated with an
increase in the probability a coal generator is retired by 0.00005 percentage points. To
further show the significant impact cheap natural gas had on coal generator retirement
probabilities, Column IV displays that a one megawatt increase in natural gas capacity
within a coal generator’s state is consistent with a 0.00001 percentage point increase in the
probability a coal generator is retired.
The price of oil is positively related to the probability of coal generator retirement,
shown in columns III and IV. Oil is typically used as a “startup fuel” for coal-fired
electricity generation, meaning that oil is used to initiate combustion that will eventually
burn coal for electricity generation. In this sense, oil can be thought of as a complement in
production/generation to coal. An increase in the price of oil by $1 per MMBtu is associated
with an increase in the probability a coal generator is retired by 0.002 percentage points.
However, additional oil capacity on the grid should not be seen as a complement to coalfired electricity generation; a startup fuel is very different from the primary fuel used in
20

One potential problem with using a linear probability model with a binary outcome is that linear
predictions are not bounded between 0 and 1. This is shown in Figure 3.2, where the marginal effect of age
on the probability of retirement dips below 0.
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Figure 3.2: The Marginal Effect of Age on Coal Generator Retirement
Note: Figure 3.2 plots the marginal effect of age on the probability of coal generator retirement from the
first year operational to 75 years old based on estimating Equation 3.1. Age is in years. The vertical lines
show the 95% confidence intervals.
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electricity generation. The more oil capacity within a state, the higher the probability that
a coal generator is retired. While the price of oil affects the probability of retirement in one
direction, the capacity of oil in the state affects it in the opposite direction. The owner of
a coal generator has to pay for coal and oil (if that is the startup fuel of choice) to produce
electricity from a coal generator, so a higher input oil price is associated with an increase in
the probability of retirement. On the other hand, the more generating capacity fueled by oil
within a state also leads to an increase in the probability a coal generator is retired. This
is due to the fact that oil-fired electricity generation is crowding-out coal-fired electricity
generation. The difference between oil prices and oil capacity is that one is a complement in
production (startup fuel) and the other is a substitute for generation (primary fuel).
The sign on the effect of coal price is perplexing. Theory would say that the higher the fuel
cost, the lower the profits, the higher the probability of coal generator retirement. Because
oil is considered a complement of generation for a coal generator, Column III could show
oil prices picking up the impact of coal prices. However, estimating Equation 3.1 without
oil price still results in a negative coefficient on coal prices. All other controls statistically
help explain coal generator retirement decisions except for total abatement cost. This is
potentially due to the way in which the control is measured as the total abatement cost
installed in a given month. A different way to account for environmental equipment is to
measure the total cost of all abatement technology for some lagged aggregate time frame.

3.5
3.5.1

Extensions
Event Study Analysis

The difference-in-differences identification strategy used to estimate the impact of mercury
regulation on coal generator retirement assumes that the treatment and control generators
have parallel trends before any mercury regulation is implemented. An event study analysis
is presented here in order to identify differences in trends in addition to levels between
treatment and control coal generators [1]. Following [38], this study estimated the following
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the Probability of Retirement

Mercury

I

II

0.08898***
(0.01)

0.04504
(0.04)
-0.03484***
(0.00)
0.00053***
(0.00)
0.00000
(0.00)

0.199
230,592

0.293
230,592

Age
Age Squared
Total Abatement Cost
Coal Price
Natural Gas Price
Oil Price
Electricity Price
Natural Gas Capacity
Oil Capacity
R2
Observations

III

IV

0.03997
0.04331
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.03261*** -0.03368***
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00051*** 0.00052***
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00000
0.00000
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.04544*** -0.04647***
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.00005** -0.00005**
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00227*
0.00241*
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.01381***
(0.01)
0.00001***
(0.00)
0.00002***
(0.00)
0.292
227,324

0.296
227,324

Note: The dependent variable in each regression is an indicator equal to 1 if the coal-fired electricity
generator was retired in that month. Standard errors, clustered at the plant level are reported in
parentheses below the coefficients. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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flexible specification that looks for breaks in any pre-existing differences between treatment
and control coal generators, especially at the time of mercury regulation execution.

Retireipst = λ0 +

36
X

1(t = tm +d)·EverM ercuryips ·λd +Ppt +Cst +Xit +δt +δi +ipst (3.2)

d=−36

The month that mercury regulation was implemented is represented by tm . EverM ercuryips
is a binary indicator equal to one for all treatment coal generators, those that did not have
mercury abatement technology before January 2004, and is interacted with indicators for
up to 36 months prior and since the start of mercury regulation.21 All other variables
including plant controls, state controls, generator controls, generator fixed effects, and time
fixed effects are defined as in Equation 3.1. The flexible specification shows the differences in
trends between treatment and control coal generators. Identification relies on the assumption
that pre-existing trends would have persisted in the absence of mercury regulation. The
coefficients of interest are the λd ’s, which describe the changes in trends for generator-level
outcomes for treatment coal generators relative to control coal generators.
Figure 3.3 maps the λd ’s against 36 months before and after the start of mercury
regulation. Prior to mercury regulation, trends for treatment coal generators were flat
relative to control coal generators.

This indicates that pre-treatment trends were not

significantly different between treatment coal generators and control coal generators. After
mercury regulation, this pattern continues for the next three years. It is important to note
that Figure 3.3 stops before the end of the panel in order to be symmetrical to the time frame
before mercury regulation. The flexible event study results do not provide strong evidence
that there are significant changes in trends around mercury regulation implementation.
Continuing in the spirit of [38], this study estimated the following parametric event study
specification to compare to the existing results.

Retireipst = α0 + α1 · (t − tm ) · M ercuryipst + Ppt + Cst + Xit + δt + δi + ipst
21

(3.3)

The first three years of the panel are pre-treatment/pre-mercury regulation. Because the data are on a
monthly time-step, this translates to 36 months before the start of mercury regulation.
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Figure 3.3: Flexible Event Study Estimates
Note: Figure 3.3 graphs λd ’s from estimating Equation 3.2 for coal generator retirement decisions. The
vertical line at year zero indicates the year that mercury regulation was introduced. The grey diamonds
show the 95% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors are clustered by plant.
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Table 3.4: Parametric Event Study Estimates
I

II

Mercury

0.04331
0.00083**
(0.04)
(0.00)
Age
-0.03368*** -0.03314***
(0.00)
(0.00)
Age Squared
0.00052*** 0.00052***
(0.00)
(0.00)
Total Abatement Cost
0.00000
0.00000
(0.00)
(0.00)
Coal Price
-0.04647*** -0.04639***
(0.01)
(0.01)
Natural Gas Price
-0.00005** -0.00005**
(0.00)
(0.00)
Oil Price
0.00241*
0.00239*
(0.00)
(0.00)
Electricity Price
-0.01381*** -0.01379***
(0.01)
(0.01)
Natural Gas Capacity 0.00001*** 0.00001***
(0.00)
(0.00)
Oil Capacity
0.00002***
0.00002**
(0.00)
(0.00)

R2
Observations

0.296
227,324

0.297
227,324

Note: The table lists the event study estimates of the effect of mercury regulation on coal generator
retirement decisions. Column I lists the baseline estimates from Equation 3.1. Column II lists the
estimates from Equation 3.3. Robust standard errors, clustered at the plant level, are reported in
parentheses below the coefficients. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

M ercuryipst is a binary indicator equal to one for treatment coal generators after mercury
regulation implementation and zero otherwise. The gap between month t and the month that
mercury regulation was implemented is represented by (t−tm ). All other variables are defined
as in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. The coefficient of interest is α1 , which describes the change in the
slope of coal generator retirement probabilities after the introduction of mercury regulation.
The results are presented in Table 3.4. Column I lists baseline results from estimating
Equation 3.1, while Column II lists the event study results from estimating Equation 3.3.
Results from the more parametric event study analysis are similar to the baseline results for
all control variables. However, the impact of mercury regulation on coal generator retirement
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decisions is significant in the event study analysis. The key difference between the baseline,
difference-in-differences approach, and the event study is the identification strategy. The
event study coefficient of interest, α1 , is significant if the slope of coal generator retirement
probabilities changed after mercury regulation was implemented, where the difference-indifferences strategy relies on changes in coal generator retirement probabilities between a
treatment and control group. The event study does not use a control group to account for
aggregate effects that have nothing to do with mercury regulation. The results indicate that
mercury regulation significantly increased the probability of coal generator retirement, but
after controlling for the impact of mercury regulation on a set of coal generators that were,
in a sense, not subject to the regulation, mercury regulation is not found to have causally
increased the probability of coal generator retirements for those that were forced to abate or
retire (Table 3.4). In addition, a visual inspection of the retirement trends for control and
treatment coal generators does not indicate a violation of the parallel trends assumption,
which is pertinent for the difference-in-differences identification used in Equation 3.1.

3.6

Conclusion

Air emissions have been regulated for nearly 50 years in the U.S., but air pollution from the
electric power sector has only been regulated for not quite 20 years. Hazardous air pollutants,
like mercury, are emitted through fossil fuel-fired electricity generation. As early as 2003,
states began regulating the amount of mercury released from coal-fired electricity generators.
The federal government and other states followed suit and passed mercury regulations
throughout the 2000s and 2010s. An extensive quantity of research has investigated the
impact of environmental regulation on firm productivity and location choices, but much less is
known about the exit decisions resulting from such regulation. This study examines whether
mercury regulation affects the coal generator retirement decision and contributes to the
literature by analyzing direct retirement decisions of over 1,200 coal generators and exploring
other potential drivers of such retirements. A 2001-2016 panel of coal generators reveals that
owners of coal generators did not seem to be retiring these units due to various mercury
regulations. Instead, cheap natural gas prices and the vintage of the generator significantly
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influenced whether a coal generator is retired or not. Additionally, an extension is provided
that utilizes an event study to check for model assumptions. However, two open questions
still remain: Did state and federal regulation reduce the amount of mercury released from
the electric power sector? If so, was this because electricity plant managers chose to invest in
abatement technology or retire their coal generators? Exploring the effectiveness of potential
pathways for reduced air pollution through environmental regulation is useful for guiding
future public policy decisions.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
This dissertation is comprised of three studies in energy economics. Chapter 1 examines
the potential pathways by which firms were able to enter the natural gas market during
the hydraulic fracturing boom. The natural gas boom of the 2000s was characterized by
the highest prices and production in history. Advances in horizontal drilling, 3-D seismic
imaging, and hydraulic fracturing made it highly profitable for firms to produce large
quantities of shale gas. An often-overlooked source of increased production is the increase
in the number of active firms in the market. The U.S. natural gas market was historically
defined by large firms, but the boom enabled a large number of small firms - those drilling
between one and eight wells - to enter the market. To better grasp the effects of changing
market structure, this study developed a real options model of market entry and used data
on natural gas turnover to test three potential explanations for small firm entry during
the boom: (a) technological advances, (b) land lease speculation, and (c) regime changes
in natural gas demand. The analysis revealed mixed support for the first explanation but
strong support for the last two.
Chapter 2 investigates drivers of coal generator retirement using data on coal generator
turnover, delivered coal prices, and wholesale electricity prices by estimating the impact
of sunk retirement costs on the probability of coal generator retirement. By pairing an
optimal stopping model of firms’ generator retirement decisions with the retirement timing of
almost 200 coal-fired generators across the U.S., it is possible to estimate implied retirement
costs that are not typically disclosed by firms and are not publicly available. Because the
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real options model cannot impute the retirement costs for coal generators that have not
retired, I utilized propensity score matching to assign retirement cost amounts to active coal
generators. With this data, a parametric approach can estimate the impact of retirement
costs on the probability of retirement and finds that a one standard deviation increase in
retirement costs results in a 0.2% reduction in the probability of retirement. Findings are
robust across several specifications. A comparison of the predicted probability of retirement
for active coal generators against the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s reported
retirements for 2016 found that almost half of the top 20 active coal generators with the
highest predicted probability of retirement did indeed retire in 2016.
The final chapter examines how mercury regulation has impacted coal-fired electricity
generator retirements.

Previous research has emphasized the effect of environmental

regulation on firm productivity, location choices, and labor market outcomes. Yet much
less is known about how federal and state environmental regulations have affected firm exit
decisions or, as in this case, coal generator retirements. I used generator level data from
the Energy Information Administration and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
including mercury control technology, fuel costs, age, and abatement costs. The results
suggest that mercury regulation was not the sole driver of coal generator retirements;
instead, competitive natural gas prices and generator age substantially explain coal generator
retirement decisions.
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A

Appendix 1

A.1

Unit Root Tests

Given that real options results critically depend on choosing the correct stochastic process, we
tested whether data were consistent with Brownian motion instead of our assumption of mean
reversion. This is typically completed using an augmented Dickey Fuller test [23, 41, 59, 97].
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) assumes P is log-normally distributed. The logged price
level p = ln(P ) is normally distributed and follows an arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM)
dp = µdt + sdz. If p is consistent with ABM, Ito’s Lemma ensures P must be consistent
with GBM. To test that p are consistent with ABM, we ran a restricted regression

(pt − pt−1 ) = β0 + β1 (pt−1 − pt−2 ) + t

(1)

and unrestricted regression

(pt − pt−1 ) = β0 + β1 (pt−1 − pt−2 ) + β2 t + β3 pt−1 + t

(2)

The null hypothesis that corresponds with p being ABM is H0 : β2 = β3 = 0.1 This null
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level for natural gas wellhead prices (Table A.1
). This is consistent with previous literature that has indicated that natural resource prices
exhibited mean reversion tendencies [35]. It is not possible to perform a unit root test for
natural gas proved reserves per well, since this study uses only data from 1989 to 1999.
However, Figure A.1 appears to reject the GBM specification.

A.2

Geometric Mean Reversion Parameter Estimation

After determining that Brownian motion is inappropriate for modeling both natural gas
prices and reserves, we turned to geometric mean reversion (GMR) dP = rP (P̄ − P )P dt +
σP P dzP . The geometric mean reversion model can be written as the following:

Pt+1 = Pt + rP (P̄ − Pt )Pt + σP Pt t
1

This set-up is also true for testing if reserves R follow GBM.
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(3)

Table A.1 : Unit Root Test for U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price Data, Monthly January
1976-December 1999
Unrestricted regression
Coefficient
Estimate
β0
0.0186
β1
0.276
β2
0.00004
β3
-0.0392
Restricted regression
β0
0.0035
β1
0.268
N = 286
Prob > F = 0.0046

Std. Error
0.0086
0.0572
0.00006
0.0125

t-statistic
2.17
4.82
0.68
-3.14

0.0041
0.0579

0.84
4.63
F = 5.48

Figure A.1 : U.S. Natural Gas Proved Reserves per Well, 1989-1999
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Here, t is a standard normal random variable. To estimate the parameters rP , P̄ , and σP , we
used a series of 286 historical observations. Completing a Zivot-Andrews unit root test that
allows for a single break in the intercept of the time series on data starting in January 1976,
we determined that there was a structural break in January 2000 at the 1% significance level.
Therefore, the 286 observations began in January 1976 and continued monthly to December
1999. This structural break is consistent with the natural gas (hydraulic fracturing) boom
during which an influx of firms entered the market. It is with this pre-break data that we
completed all estimations, including the previous augmented Dickey Fuller.
We assume that the parameters of the geometric mean reversion remained constant during
the time period of estimation. Rewrite the equation for GMR as
Pt+1 − Pt
= rP P̄ − rP Pt + σP t
Pt

(4)

This equation bears characteristics of a linear regression model, with the percentage price
change

Pt+1 −Pt
Pt

as the dependent variable and Pt as the explanatory variable.

According to [86], the estimate of rP is obtained as the negative of the coefficient in front
of Pt . One way to ascertain whether GMR is a consistent assumption for natural gas prices
is to determine whether the coefficient in front of Pt is positive, since the rate of reversion rP
cannot be a negative number. The estimate for the long-run mean of prices P̄ is obtained as
the ratio of the intercept term estimated from the regression and the negative of the slope
coefficient in front of Pt . The last estimate for volatility σP is obtained as the standard error
of the regression.
Two other methods for determining whether GMR is suitable are the following: (a) the
p-value for the coefficient in front of Pt should be small, preferably less than 0.05, and (b)
the points in a scatter plot of Pt versus

Pt+1 −Pt
Pt

should vary around a straight line with no

visible cyclical or other patterns. Table A.2 displays the results of the regressions that
determine the parameter estimates for prices. Natural gas wellhead prices satisfy all three
checks described by [86]. Our results were simulated under the assumption that natural gas
wellhead prices follow GMR as previous studies have determined to be more fitting.
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Table A.2 : Geometric Mean Reversion Estimates for U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
Data
Coefficient
rP P̄
rP

Estimate

Std. Error

0.0499
-0.0235

0.0136
0.0072

N = 287
P̄ = $2.12

P-Value
0.000
0.001
rP = 0.0235
σP = 0.0692

Table A.3 : Geometric Mean Reversion Estimates for U.S. Natural Gas Recoverable
Reserves per Well Data
Coefficient
rR R̄
rR

Estimate

Std. Error

0.443
-0.00000129

0.210
0.000000606

N = 10
R̄ =343,235

P-Value
0.068
0.065
rR = 0.00000129
σR = 0.0316

It is not possible to perform a Zivot-Andrews unit root test allowing for a structural
break in the intercept of the natural gas proved reserves per well time series due to limited
observations. Simulations were completed with the time series from 1989 to 1999 following
that of natural gas wellhead prices. Using [86], natural gas proved reserves per well satisfy
two of the three checks for GMR (Table A.3 ). The p-value associated with the coefficient on
Rt is slightly larger than the prescribed 0.05, but that coefficient is negative as it should be
before applying -1 to find rR . We checked the sensitivity of the results by modeling natural
gas proved reserves per well as GBM and found no change.
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Appendix 2

B.1

Unit Root Tests

Given that real options results critically depend on choosing the correct stochastic process,
we tested data for consistency with Brownian motion instead of the assumption of mean
reversion. This is typically completed using an augmented Dickey Fuller test [23, 41, 59, 97].
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM) assumes P is log-normally distributed.2 The logged
price level p = ln(P ) is normally distributed and follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
(ABM) dp = µdt + sdz. If p is consistent with ABM, Ito’s Lemma ensures P must be
consistent with GBM. To test that p are consistent with ABM, we ran a restricted regression

(pt − pt−1 ) = β0 + β1 (pt−1 − pt−2 ) + t

(5)

and unrestricted regression

(pt − pt−1 ) = β0 + β1 (pt−1 − pt−2 ) + β2 t + β3 pt−1 + t

(6)

The null hypothesis that corresponds with p being ABM is H0 : β2 = β3 = 0. This null
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% or 5% level for all coal generators in the analysis. This is
true for coal prices and electricity prices. Tables B.1 and B.2 provide an example of the
augmented Dickey Fuller tests for a random retired coal generator.

B.2

Geometric Mean Reversion Parameter Estimation

After determining that Brownian motion is inappropriate for modeling both coal prices and
electricity prices, we turned to geometric mean reversion (GMR) dP = rP (P̄ − P )P dt +
σP P dzP . The geometric mean reversion model can be written as the following:

Pt+1 = Pt + rP (P̄ − Pt )Pt + σP Pt t
2

P is for either PE or PC
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(7)

Table B.1 : Unit Root Test for Delivered Coal Prices at a Random Plant
Unrestricted regression
Coefficient
β0
β1
β2
β3
Restricted regression
β0
β1
N = 90
Prob > F = 0.0200

Estimate Std. Error
0.374
0.144
-0.363
0.0995
-0.000365
0.000222
-0.111
0.0558
0.00136
-0.393

0.00607
0.0985
F = 4.093

Table B.2 : Unit Root Test for Wholesale Electricity Prices at a Random Generator
Unrestricted regression
Coefficient
β0
β1
β2
β3
Restricted regression
β0
β1
N = 145
Prob > F = 0.00000019
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Estimate
0.0314
2.717
-0.401
-0.00275

Std. Error
0.0836
0.566
0.0732
0.000679

-0.168
-0.00417

0.0823
0.0221
F = 15.06

Here, t is a standard normal random variable. To estimate the parameters rP , P̄ , and σP ,
we used either FERC 714 data or PJM Zonal Prices. We assumed that the parameters of the
geometric mean reversion remain constant during the time period of estimation to rewrite
the equation for GMR as
Pt+1 − Pt
= rP P̄ − rP Pt + σP t
Pt

(8)

This equation bears characteristics of a linear regression model, with the percentage price
change

Pt+1 −Pt
Pt

as the dependent variable and Pt as the explanatory variable.

According to [86], the estimate of rP is obtained as the negative of the coefficient in front
of Pt . One way to check whether GMR is a consistent assumption for prices is to determine
whether the coefficient in front of Pt is positive since the rate of reversion rP cannot be a
negative number. The estimate for the long-run mean of prices P̄ is obtained as the ratio
of the intercept term estimated from the regression and the negative of the slope coefficient
in front of Pt . The last estimate for volatility σP is obtained as the standard error of the
regression.
Two other methods for determining if GMR is suitable are the following: (a) the p-value
for the coefficient in front of Pt should be small, preferably less than 0.05, and (b) the points
in a scatter plot of Pt versus

Pt+1 −Pt
Pt

should vary around a straight line with no visible

cyclical or other patterns. Tables B.3 and B.4 display the results of the regressions that
determine the parameter estimates for coal and electricity prices for a random coal generator
in our analysis. Coal and electricity prices satisfied all three checks described by [86] for all
generators. Our results were simulated under the assumption that coal and electricity prices
follow GMR.
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Table B.3 : Geometric Mean Reversion Estimates for Delivered Coal Prices at a Random
Plant
Coefficient
rP P̄
rP

Estimate
0.173
-0.0460

N = 91
P̄ = $3.76

Std. Error
0.0598
0.0160
rP = 0.0460
σP = 0.0622

Table B.4 : Geometric Mean Reversion Estimates for Wholesale Electricity Prices at a
Random Generator
Coefficient
rP P̄
rP

Estimate
0.226
-0.0133

N = 146
P̄ = $16.99

Std. Error
0.0687
0.00436
rP = 0.0133
σP = 0.343
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